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
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
EXCHANGE



IDEALISTIC BEGINNINGS IN ENGLAND

BY

JOHN PICKETT TURNER, A. M.



Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Philosophy,
Columbia University

1910



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PREFACE.

Whether any excuse should be offered for going into a period that has so often been the object of inquiry on the part of more experienced students, is left for the reader of the following studies to decide, but a word as to the genesis of the paper cannot be out of place. It began in an inquiry into the signification of the term *imagination* in earlier English writers. This was found to be a trustworthy index of the several philosophers' positions in psychology. Interesting light was thrown upon the beginnings of idealism. With the English germs of idealism so completely laid bare, it has been thought worth while to retrace the study with especial reference to that movement. In tracing this gradual development of and continued emphasis upon the synthetic function of mind, it has been thought relevant to the study to keep watch upon the formal explanation of union as well as the explanation that must underlie the description given by each author. Hence the importance of and attention given to the principle of association in these studies. That these studies have been made from the stand-point of physiological psychology, is too apparent to call for the statement.

The labor of carrying out any thorough study of Hobbes has been greatly lightened since the appearance of Professor Woodbridge's compilation of selections from his writings.¹ I take this opportunity to acknowledge the great usefulness of this volume, from which for the most part my quotations are taken, and my indebtedness to its author. In the case of Berkeley and Locke the editions of Professor A. C. Fraser were used, while in the case of Hume that of Professor L. A. Selbe-Bigge.

(¹) *The Philosophy of Hobbes*, 1903.

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INTRODUCTION.



INTRODUCTION.

The reception accorded Sterling's *The Secret of Hegel*, the epoch-making character of which all freely admit, has usually been explained as a reaction against the doctrines of Spencer, Huxley and other espousers of the evolutionary hypothesis. But it is a far more significant fact that the whole transcendental movement was in its origin a reaction against the advance of science. The germanization of British thought is a topic of local importance, but the beginnings of idealism arouses a more general interest. The present paper undertakes to trace the first crude steps of this movement which, beginning with Hobbes ended in the philosophy of Kant. While an endless amount of work has been put upon the transition from the English school to Kant, it has been done in a broad way and has rarely devoted itself to psychology, as is the case with this paper. The gradual development of the idealistic mind in England has been neglected. While the present paper necessarily brings into relief this aspect of the English school, it must be at once understood that the writer does not lose sight of the direct line of the school—a phase of the subject that has not been neglected—just as Kant's continental antecedents have not been forgotten. But it is maintained that the developments in England con-

stitute the best explanation of how Kantianism came to be.

While Bacon had done much to arouse thinking men, the philosophy of Hobbes constitutes the first systematic break of modern thought with the past; what is wanting in Bacon is found in Hobbes,—a clear statement of his case. The Baconian division between science and religion was reasserted by Hobbes and so extended as to enable him to treat as relevant to his investigation only the world of sensuous experience. His statement, if dogmatic, was at least clear and his position unwavering. The work of Locke, on the other hand, tho' it has long been regarded as epoch-making by reason of its radical character, marks a distinct return to the past in some respects. His general attitude towards mind, despite his much written of sensationalism was, when all is considered, of a reactionary colour. While Hobbes declared for an absolutely homogeneous universe, Locke in an unmistakable manner opposed mind to matter and introduced an intervening world of ideas. Altho the distinction between mind and matter was not so rigid as that of Cartesian dualism, this leaning towards Plato does not harmonize well with his Hobbistic sensational psychology which Locke has had the credit of re-asserting. Where Hobbes had in a clear and unmistakable manner decried a faculty—psychology. Locke in just as unmistakable a manner restores a new set of faculties, called by

him powers, or natural faculties, by the use of which a directing and active mind gets into touch with and systematizes sensuous experience. The Lockean attitude may be easily explained. While accepting certain new theories, his openness of mind forbade his neglecting certain old ones regarded as yet to be overthrown. Such a compromising position on the part of Locke was but a goad to Berkeley, who completed the reaction implicit in Locke's teachings. His return to the past was at least novel. In his psychological idealism he crossed by way of a consideration of primary and secondary qualities into a one-world theory all his own, which tho' directly opposed to, had many points in common with, that of Hobbes. As in the case of Hobbes his position was a dogmatic one, but remarkable for its consistency. Starting with Hobbes-Lockean sensationalism, developing Locke's signification of *idea*, he re-interprets the doctrine in such a way as to destroy its meaning; what in his two predecessors had vouchsafed an external world independent of mind, became for him nothing more than the operation of mind. His alliance with sensationalism proved to be but a mask for the restoration of mind. The scholastic faculty of will, which Hobbes had successfully discarded, is restored and more,—it becomes for Berkeley the essence of original and active mind, marking off individuals from each other. Hume, who extended the same doctrine into the realm of mind,

carried Berkeley to his implicit conclusion. He reasoned that if sensuous experience does not signify an external world independent of mind, then there is no proof that subjective experience signifies mind, the inner world. All we have of a certainty are two streams of experience; what the uniting principle of our experience is, is an insoluble mystery. As the materialism of Hobbes had been replaced by a dualism of the Cartesian type by Locke, so the spiritualism of Berkeley is replaced by the Humean dualism of experience. So, too, as the dogmatic position taken by Hobbes had been followed by the more openminded Locke, the dogmatic position taken by Berkeley had been followed by the still more openminded Hume. In assuming this non-committal position, declaring only for the existence of two streams of experience, Hume took the step that rendered Kantianism a possibility. While trying to destroy prejudice in favor of an ordered external world, such as we fancy that we have about us, Hume emphasized very significantly the part that the mind plays in giving continuity to our experience of nature. The balance was thus tilted in favor of mind for Kant, although there can be little doubt of Hume's leaning to a mechanistic interpretation of nature. If Hume's attack upon the causal principle aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumber, the Humean emphasis upon mental creations suggested the way out to him, while the significant, if loose, Humean use

of the term imagination gave the cue to him that enabled him to bring into closer union perception and conception. In a larger sense, therefore, it made possible the significant claim of the critical philosophy to bring harmony into the opposing schools of empiricism and rationalism. For Kant really did little more than give a systematic defense of Hume's position.

I.

HOBBS: DOGMATIC MATERIALISM.

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That Hobbes was for many years the most hated man in all England, is a fact far from insignificant, even for psychology. For although his labor in this field was incidental to his work in political science, it constitutes a break with the past the effects of which are felt to-day. To him as much as to any other *one* man is due the loss of prestige suffered by the ancient doctrine of innate ideas. Greek intellectualism met for the first time, in his psychology, the instrument that may yet play havoc with it and physiological psychology became a possibility. For while what he did in psychology has its shortcomings from the standpoint of neurology, examined in the light of the advancement of the science of physiology in his day, his contributions are nothing less than remarkable.

It is well, however, to call attention at the outset to the relation that Hobbes sustained to the intuitionists; for unless this be borne constantly in mind, his treatment of mind may seem one-sided. Hobbes, as is the case with all sensationists, in combating innate ideas went to the other extreme. This will help us to understand why it is that Hobbes lays so much emphasis

upon the *conservative* aspect of mind, which in the light of his unbounded confidence in the power of mind, may seem undue.

Before entering upon his long career as writer and thinker, Hobbes had already come to the conclusion that consciousness is dependent upon change. As he afterwards wrote:

"To be always sensible of one and the same thing, and not to be sensible at all of anything is almost all one."

If now consciousness exists, which Hobbes does not question, it is explicable in terms of change. Here Hobbes turns to Galileo whose theory of motion certainly suited his needs. Change is motion essentially; that is a fact beyond question. 'That all mutation consists in motion', is for Hobbes a general truth, not accepted only by those whose 'natural discourse has been corrupted with former opinions received from their masters and who have not bent their minds to the inquiring out of truth'.⁽¹⁾

To pass thus from Galileo to Hobbes is but a step; change in the mind is in its essence what change in nature is, motion. Sensation "is nothing but motion in some internal part of the sentient". The world within the mind no less than the world without the mind is a world of motion; the "internal parts", or the "fluids", of the body are in constant motion as well as the external

⁽¹⁾ *Elements of Philosophy*, Chapter VI, Par. 5.

world. Here we come to the key to Hobbes' system. From the above quotation it can easily be seen that for Hobbes the one indisputable fact is that all change is a manifestation of motion. From his own significant observation that consciousness depends upon change, reinforced by the teachings of Galileo, Hobbes leaps to the center of his whole metaphysical system, that motion is the one reality, the cause of all things that are, with no cause but itself. From this universal he then proceeds in rigorous fashion to make his deductions. But despite his great confidence in the deductive method, Hobbes still makes valuable contributions to the subject of psychology, as we shall soon see.

The student of Hobbes' psychology, then, must approach it through the concept of motion; the technique that Galileo applied to physics is to be intensified and applied to mind and its relation to the external world. When a body is presented to the senses of a sentient creature such as man, it by its own motion sets in motion the internal parts of the creature counter to which is the motion from within (which for our author explains that appearance of *outness* that all our phantasms have) and there arises concomitantly with this motion and reaction the phantasm called sense, the persistence of which is called an *image* or *fancy*. The persistence of the image is accounted for by the fundamental

laws of motion. Now, it is just these images, gained from sense, maintained according to the laws of motion, that constitute what is known as mind; for images are the irreducible element of the thinking process. Thus Hobbes replaces a mind filled with innate ideas with a mind of moving images not inborn, but gained from experience. And instead of a mind that goes out and by means of forms comprehends objects, such as Ralph Cudworth and other Platonists defended, we have as mind a moving sea of images that *constitute the register of past experience*.

And here we come to the significant aspect of mind for Hobbes, the mind as the *conservator* of experience. Nothing brings this out better than his discussion of the imagination, which is the most fundamental term used by Hobbes in his treatment of mental phenomena. To cite his words:

“For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latins call the *imagination*, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all other senses. But the Greeks call it *fancy*; which signifies *appearance*, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but *decaying sense*: and is found in men, and many other living creatures, as well sleeping, as waking. The decay of sense in men waking, is not the decay of motion made in the sense; but the obscuring of it, in such manner as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the stars * * * And any object being removed from our eyes, though the impression it made in us remain, yet other objects more present succeeding, and working on us, the imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak, as the voice of man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the

time is, after the sight or sense of any object, the weaker is the imagination. For the continual change of man's body destroys in time the parts which in the sense were moved; so that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us."⁽¹⁾

And again later we find him saying: "All fancies are motions within us, *relics* of those made in the sense". Let no one think the word "decay" significant, it is clear from the above that it does not mean that motion ceases; but is merely counteracted by other motions, and the concomitant images, merely obscured for the time by new images, reassert themselves in sleep and in the processes of thought.

A test of their strength may easily be made by anyone in sleep, when images take on the vivacity of phantasms of sense, as may be seen from the following citation:

"IMAGINATION therefore is nothing else but sense decaying, or weakened, by the absence of the object. But what may be the cause of this decay or weakening? Is the motion the weaker, because the object is taken away? If it were, then phantasms would always and necessarily be less clear in the imagination, than they are in sense; which is not true. For in dreams, which are the imaginations of those which sleep, they are no less clear than in sense itself. But the reason why in men waking the phantasms of things past are more obscure than those of things present, is this, that their organs being at the same time moved by other present objects, those phantasms are the less predominant. Whereas in sleep, the passages being shut up, external action does not at all disturb or hinder internal motion."⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Leviathan*, Chapter II, Par. 2.

⁽²⁾ *Elements of Philosophy*, (M 1, 396).

What has been experienced is thus successfully retained as images, and the primary function of mind is just this conservation of experience. To this subject we shall return later but for the present we shall turn to another problem.

Hobbes agrees with DesCartes in his distinction between the essential and non-essential qualities that constitute an external object, or body,—or rather the objective and subjective aspects of bodies. This distinction, years afterwards, became current in philosophical writings in the terminology of Locke as the *primary* and *secondary qualities* of bodies. The essential qualities for Hobbes are, of course, motion and extension, which, as we have seen, fits in well with his theory of sensation. That our images, then, in no wise agree with their objects, goes without saying for Hobbes; the vast majority of qualities that we attribute to bodies are not in them at all. This may be gone at experimentally. Observation teaches us that images may arise in the mind even when there is no external object present to the senses; in such cases a phantasm is beyond all doubt subjective. Again there are instances in which two phantasms arise when only one external object is present to the senses; in such a case it would appear that either the one or the other of these images is subjective,—if one is unreal, then why have we not reason for believing the other also in the same case. Such is the in-

ductive proof used by our author to establish the subjectivity of phantasms, which finally is concluded with these words:

"And from hence also it followeth, that *whatsoever accidents* or qualities our senses make us think there be in the *world*, they be *not* there, but are *seeming* and *apparitions* only; the things that really *are* in the world without us, are those *motions* by which these seemings are caused. And this is the *great deception* of sense, which also is to be by sense *corrected*, for as sense telleth me, when I see *directly*, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by *reflection*, that colour is not in the object." (¹)

Much might be made of the phenomenology of Hobbes, despite the inductive proof here offered for what he elsewhere treats as a deduction from his universal that motion causes all and therefore phantasms. But the value of such an attack is open to question. In how far does his position differ from that of modern science according to which the real world of objects apart from mind is, theoretically at least, a dark colourless sea of moving atoms? What attitude we are to assume towards Hobbes here, depends in large measure upon the avenue of approach. From the standpoint of open-minded experimentalism the situation is just what we find it, and further investigation is certainly not precluded. But if one approaches the subject with the philosophers, *a priori*, from a two-world theory, the case is quite different. We then have the problem of Cartesian dualism, an old friend, but in an entirely new

(¹) *Human Nature*, Chap. II, last Par.

dress; for it must be remembered that images constitute the very fabric of mind for Hobbes. Stated in his terms, the problem loses some of its usual mystery and significance. This has important bearings upon the formality of the problem. The question for us now is a definite one, just how are images caused by motion? Granting that sensation is motion and that it is dependent upon motion, how do we know that sensation causes images? From the philosopher's standpoint, Hobbes does not appear to fully appreciate the difficulty before him; the knot that so many philosophers would untie, he, in the eyes of many, merely cuts. He takes the liberty of passing freely from phantasms to motion and from motion to phantasms. Is this so easy as our author would have us believe? When he says that the motion of the external object sets in motion the internal parts of the body, there is no objection to that, speaking generally; that appears to be good physics. But what, pray, has this to do with the origin of apparitions, or seemings, which are merely concomitant with motion? Does Hobbes, then, not miss an excellent opportunity to assume the Humean position on causation? As a philosopher, three positions besides Cartesian dualism were open to him, all of which have been unduly stressed since his time. The idealist has obviated the difficulty by making it his starting point, since the subject and his phantasms constitute the entire universe. The pallelolist undertakes to define no

relationship between the two worlds; apparitions and motions just *are* and happen also to be concomitant. The third position is that of thoroughgoing materialism, which is where we find Hobbes; for motion is the cause of all things, and is, therefore, the cause of apparition. Approaching the subject in an empirical temper, observing our phantasms he says:

(They) "are not always the same; new ones appear to us, and old ones vanish, according as we apply our organs of sense now to the one object, now to another. Wherefore they are generated and perish. And from here it is manifest, that *they are some change or mutation in the sentient.*"⁽¹⁾

That is to say, for Hobbes there is no such problem as that of mind and matter. Whether this be called naive realism or rank materialism, in this respect Hobbes goes back to Democritus, or if you choose, anticipates the position taken by many thinkers since the advent of the evolutionary hypothesis. For as the generations have passed the Cartesian problem has gradually lost its significance. Our author, however, was not unmindful of the intellectualist; if he chooses to ask how it is that notice can be taken of these changes in a sentient creature, whether it be by means of some internal sense, we have Hobbes' reply:

"I answer, by sense itself, namely, by the memory which for some time remains in us of things sensible, though they themselves pass away. For he that perceives that he perceives remembers, *sentire se sentisse, meminisse est.*"⁽²⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Elements of Philosophy*, Chap. XXV, Par. 2.

⁽²⁾ *Elements of Philosophy*, Chap. XXV, Par. 1.

It now becomes clear that our author, by his naive position, if one chooses to call it such, has really anticipated the modern position on the subject. Mind is conservative, it is the power of one experience to call up another; images are the means by which it is done. Thought, as Hobbes sees it, is reflective,—that is, so far as thought is relevant to the discussion. Or if Hobbes had stated it in present-day language, he might well have said: Mind represents inhibited action; it is, then, an organ of behavior and is as much a part of the organism as the hand, the leg or any other organ of the organism. Whence, then, this opposition of mind and matter? In such a psychology there is no place for this problem, purely formal in its nature, and in his neglect of it Hobbes gives another example of how nearly he approximates the present-day physiological psychology. It must not be supposed either that in the above citation there is any disposition to belittle intelligent inquiry into the nature of perception. Hobbes says: "Of all phenomena, or appearances which are near us, the most admirable is apparition itself." The absence of the evolutionary hypothesis helped to make the problem possible and significant in those days; for this reason its neglect by Hobbes is really all the more commendable.

We shall have occasion to refer to other respects in which Hobbes is in alliance with present-

day psychology. But perhaps none is more significant than his definition of sensation, which may not be out of place at this point:

"Sense is a phantasm, made by the *reaction* and endeavor outwards in the organ of sense, caused by the endeavor inwards from the object, remaining for some time more or less." ⁽¹⁾

If we rob this definition of some of its cruder physiological presuppositions as to the function of the heart, quite irrelevant here and due to the state of physiology in his day, we shall see how very similar it is to the present-day theories as to sense stimuli and consequent reaction involved in perception. All this is quite interesting in the light of the fact that Locke has had the credit for doing so much to overthrow the doctrine of innate ideas and other ancient doctrines. Much that has been attributed to Locke should be credited to the influence of Hobbes; certainly his revolutionary doctrine that there are no innate ideas was set forth by Hobbes in its baldest details, as we have just seen a few pages back. That Hobbes' position was fully appreciated by his contemporaries, can be easily gathered by the reading of a few pages of the writings of Ralph Cudworth. But there is more in Hobbes than this bald denial of intuitionism. In the few lines that he devoted to the analysis of the behavior of mental phenomena he did some good constructive

⁽¹⁾ *Elements of Philosophy*, Chap. XXV, Par. 5.

work. We must not allow the fact that he was fighting the intuitionist and was therefore laying great stress upon the fact that our ideas are gained from experience rather than inborn to blind us to the importance of his work in a positive direction. But to properly set this forth, we must turn back again to the fundamental nature of mind.

Attention has already been directed to the stress Hobbes laid upon the conservative aspect of mind, but the manner in which mind retains experience may be set forth in greater detail. To the simple law of motion, not often reflected upon, according to our author, the persistence as well as the origin of all the images, or fancies, that flit across the mind, is due and to that alone. This is in a nut-shell the *how* of retention, and it is just these "relics" of sensuous experience that constitute the very fabric of mind. Nor has mind any original power whereby it can introduce other images than those that it has thus acquired. Long before the sober Locke had declared that the mind can frame unto itself no new simple ideas, Hobbes had set forth in a manner not so foreign in spirit to modern physiological-psychology, the origin of all our ideas, images, fancies, or whatever one wishes to call them. His ignorance of the nature of neural connections does not invalidate the value of his description. All the images in our mind are due to sensation, motions in the internal parts

of the sentient creature, and they persist in accordance with, or in obedience to, the fundamental laws of motion, the motion of the internal parts continuing after the removal of the stimulus, just as the "waves of the storm-tossed sea cannot give over their motion" although the storm has subsided. Since this motion of the internal parts can never completely cease, the image that is concomitant with it, or that is caused by it, as Hobbes puts it, can never really disappear from the mind. It may become obscured by the thousands of other impressions that are constantly pouring in upon the mind through the gateway of sensation, and therefore become less and less vivid as time elapses,—but completely disappear they cannot. Ideas pass out of consciousness for the simple reason that other ideas come in to crowd them out, taking their places, different motions counteracting each other in the internal parts. But this does not mean that these ideas, although they have been forced to retire, have, therefore, been obliterated from the mind. For it is just these images, ideas, or fancies, relics of experience, that constitute the mind; since this is so, to obliterate them would be to destroy mind. Thought is the power to control images; hence for Hobbes the thinking process presupposes sensation.

An excellent opportunity for the study of the imagination (mental imagery, as we would say now-a-days) is offered in dreams. Here we have

relics of past experiences active in their greatest vividness. For the organs of sense are numbed in sleep and all access to the world without is shut off; and the mind, for this reason, is not open to the onset of new impressions that in waking moments so quickly force into retirement other images. So vivid are these images and fancies of sleep that there is nothing to be compared with them but the phantasms of sense. It is, therefore, for our author anything but surprising that some people sometimes confuse the images and phantasms of actual perception in waking life with those of dream life. Thus Brutus, dreaming in his tent on the field of battle, sees the form of great Cæsar standing before him with words of warning on his lips with such vividness that on waking he would have it that the spirit of dead Cæsar had appeared to him, being astonished that his servant neither heard nor saw him. Indeed the waking life and dream life are not so different as we would have it generally; the two experiences possess such similarities that it is really difficult to set forth an accurate distinction. If such can be made, it lies in the fact that our waking life experiences are more inclusive than our dream life experiences. He continues:

“and because waking I often observe the absurdity of dreams, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dream not, though when I dream, I think myself awake.”⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Leviathan*, Chap. II.

It is interesting to note, too, in this connection that our author anticipated the work of Spencer when he gives it as his opinion that from

"Ignorance of how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from visions and sense, did arise the greatest part of the religion of the gentiles in times past, that worshipped satyrs, fawns, nymphs, and the like; and now-a-days the opinions that rude people have of fairies, ghosts, and goblins, and of the power of witches." (1)

All of which would never have been the case, such is our author's firm conviction, had savage peoples been acquainted with the workings of the human mind. So, too, the ignorance of the play of mental imagery accounts for the superstition of rude people. And in this connection Hobbes finds occasion for offence. How much better, he would know, is the scholastic doctrine of volition? In teaching that images and ideas arise in the mind at the beck and call of the will of the individual, are not schoolmen fostering just such superstition? Those who so teach are both deceived and deceiving; mental images are not the effect of our will, but our will is rather the effect of our mental images. But we cannot here take up volition, the treatment of which will be given in greater detail later.

From what has been said up to this point, it now becomes quite clear that the imagination is a very fundamental term, for Hobbes. It is, in fact, another word for mind, a term that carries well that emphasis that Hobbes has seen fit to

(1) *Leviathan*, Chap. II.

place upon the conservative aspect of mind. For mind is not for him an original power, but on the contrary, the conservation of sensuous experience. Now, the term imagination is used to cover all these mental images and processes of thought. For, in his own words,

"besides sense, and thoughts, and trains of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech and method the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures."⁽¹⁾

Man's difference from all other animals consists merely in his better use of the imagination. He has, to be definite, no other faculties or powers, or divinely implanted gifts. Such as are so called and commonly supposed to be are but other names for the imagination, when regarded now from this and now from that aspect. Nothing in the whole of Hobbes' writings is clearer than this attitude of his towards mental imagery. Memory thus is another name for imagination, that emphasizes the fact that the experience under consideration belongs to past time, or in the words of present-day psychology, the images of memory are localized in time and place, while those of the imagination are "set free." Thus it is clear:

"This *decaying sense*, when we would express the thing itself, I mean *fancy* itself, we call *imagination*, as I said before: but when we would express decay, signify that the sense is fading, old and past, it is called *memory*. So that

⁽¹⁾ *Leviathan*, Chap. III.

imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names."⁽¹⁾

Likewise the understanding is another name for imagination, or an operation of the imagination; for to understand a thing is to call up an image of the thing named, or the images that correspond to the sign given, the association of an image of sound with one of sight, say. If when the word cow is spoken in the presence of a child, the visual image of a cow arises in the mind of the child, then it may be said that the child understands, the two images of cow being associated in the mind of the child, it understands the sign given. But the child being unable to call up the image of a horse when the word *hippos* is spoken, is said not to understand, the sign given not calling up the visual image that should correspond. These two images not being associated in the child's sensuous experience, it has no understanding on that point.

Beasts, then, no less than men, have understandings; for they have images to correspond to the signs given them, as is most frequently illustrated when they do our bidding. When, then, the imagination is active in response to given signs, visual and auditory and other images being properly associated, we may call this understanding. //

So likewise, it is with all other mental processes; they are but mere names for one and the same

⁽¹⁾ *Leviathan*, Chap. II.

thing, the imagination, but this can best be set fourth in our author's own words:

"To consider a thing is to imagine it; to understand a thing is to imagine it; to hope and fear, is to imagine the things hoped for and feared. The difference is, that when we imagine the consequence of anything, we are said to consider that thing; and when we imagine from a sign, and especially from those signs we call names, we are said to understand his meaning that maketh the sign, and when we reason, we imagine the consequences of affirmations and negations joined together; when we hope or fear, we imagine things good or hurtful to ourselves; in-so-much as all these are but imaginations diversely named from different circumstances; as any man may perceive as easily as he can look into his thoughts." (1)

If we are to take seriously what our author has set forth up to this point, certain conclusions are inevitable. All our faculties are of one fundamental nature, different names for ways in which images behave. In so far as setting one faculty over against another, after the manner of Kant, this is out of the question; for there is no sufficient reason for it, there being no difference in them. They are all the same fundamental thing, which when it acts so, we call by such and such name; and when it acts differently, we call by another name. Regarded in this light of mere names for the behavior of images, there could be little harm in a faculty psychology; but if one comes to think too seriously of these separate faculties of mind, it would according to Hobbes' view, be very misleading to speak of the different faculties of mind. Far better always to bear in

(1) *Questions Concerning Human Liberty* (M. V. 358-359).

mind the fact that these are fundamentally one and the same thing, are of one and the same nature. To do this in a thorough-going way will, he feels, be to relieve us of the foolishness of the schoolmen, who believe that this or that faculty has power over the images in the mind. And it may also be had in mind that it might have saved us from Kant's compartmental aspect of mind.

The consequences implicit in the position of Hobbes are far reaching. The human mind, so viewed, is an integral part of the universe; the motions that disturb it, which cause our ideas, are the same motions that constitute the universe as a whole. Our individual minds are part and parcel of the universe and possess just as little liberty as this figure allows. Would it help to replace the term motion here with the term mind? This is what Berkeley, with some changes of conception, (to say nothing of Edwards and other good theologians) really did. Berkeley, however, keeps the power of forming ideas in the mind in the individual, while sensations are caused by universal mind; but it is the content of the term (will) that enables him to make the separation between the two realms. If will is to be regarded as a fundamental term in the study of mind, Berkeley's psychological interpretation of the universe is much to the point.

But the conception of Hobbes is quite thorough-going. The term motion, which he had used to explain both mind and matter, does not allow of

this separation as does the term will, so far as terms go. Let us, then, follow up a little further the implied consequences of his position. We as individuals cannot think, imagine, or reason because we desire to or will to, but quite to the contrary, we perform these acts of mind simply because we are a part of the universe, which is in motion, of which the essence is motion, which is likewise the essence of mind. Our imagination is active, our thoughts play, just in the same way and for the same reason that the sun moves, the stars move, and the waves of the sea lash in their fury. Our minds are not substances distinct from extension, endowed with original power, as with DesCartes and Locke. We are, on the contrary, of one essence with the universe of extension, subject to the laws of motion, its essence. Particular attention is drawn to these logical consequences implicit in the position of Hobbes for reasons that will appear later.

Images that arise in the mind are of two distinct kinds; *simple*, "as when one imagineth a a man, or a horse, which he hath seen before, and *compounded*, as when from the sight of a man seen at one time, and of a horse seen at another, we conceive in our mind a centaur." It will be noticed that what Hobbes here calls *compounded* imagination is what is generally referred to as the imagination, or more exactly, as the *creative* imagination. Popularly, this compounding of

images, or better, these creations of the imagination, are thought of as the work of the will; this conception is, as set forth above, absolutely foreign to the conception of mind entertained by Hobbes. That images are not under the control of the will may easily be discovered by a little observation of the working of our own minds, according to our author. This doctrine of the power of the will along with those kindred doctrines that our good thoughts are due to God while our evil thoughts are due to the devil, to say nothing of the elaborate system where it is taught that

"the senses receive the species of things and deliver them to the common sense, which in turn delivers them to the fancy, which again delivers them to the memory, whence they are handed over to the judgment" etc. (¹)

are all in one bundle classed as the foolishness of the deceived and deceiving schoolmen, who with their many words still make nothing understood. None of these doctrines have any foundation; least of all is it true that the will controls the play of mental images. Quite the contrary:

"Sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but always, and necessarily such as the things we see, hear, and consider, suggest them to us; and therefore are not effects of our will, *but our will of them.*" (²)

(¹) *Leviathan*, Chap. II.

(²) *Leviathan*, (M. III, 360).

How nearly Hobbes' conception of will approaches that offered to-day may be seen from the following citation:

"In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, *not the faculty*, of willing. And beasts that have deliberation, must necessarily also have will. The definition of the will, given commonly by the Schools, that it is a *rational appetite*, is not good. For if it were, then could there be no voluntary act against reason. For a voluntary act, is that, which proceedeth from the will, and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation, then the deliberation is the same that I have given here. Will, therefore, is the last appetite in deliberating."(*)

"As in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do; which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from liberty; and yet because every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual change, whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes, proceed from necessity, so that to him that could see the connection of those causes, the necessity of all men's voluntary actions, would appear manifest."(*)

The foregoing citation, I think, sets forth correctly Hobbes' conception of will. While there are other passages of a more or less popular nature that might be construed otherwise, these, his definite statements, should be taken as the test of his doctrine. The meaning of it is this: Hobbes does not regard the concept will as fundamental and ultimate—hence it is not fruitful to use such a term in the analysis of mind.

(*) *Leviathan*, Chap. VI.

(*) *Leviathan*, (M. III, 196).

The term is popular and anthropomorphic. Here he is opposed to Berkeley, for whom the term will is fundamental and original. Hobbes does, however, take carefully into consideration the same phenomena that Berkeley treats under the term will. The treatment of Hobbes is of a thoroughly scientific nature. Man's use of arbitrary signs by which he controls his impulses and gets the better of nature and environment is more than once alluded to in the works of Hobbes. We shall have occasion to refer to this subject, however, under another head where it will be taken up in greater detail.

But the above doctrines, especially those with reference to the will, do not mean that these compounded images do not, to all intents and purposes, constitute real creations. This is just what images are, and causal explanation does not make them any the less so. Mind, indeed, is quite given to this habit of compounding images, and it is this with the use of signs that has helped to make the difference between man and his brothers in nature. It is from this source that all man's lofty constructions flow. And it is his perpetuation of this habit that enabled him to cope all the more successfully with natural obstacles. Out of this power, or habit, comes philosophy, which if cultivated, will according to the teachings of Hobbes, do so much for mankind.

But unfortunately there is another side to this habit of compounding images; for what gives, un-

der the significant name of the creative imagination (as it is now called), such lofty conceptions and what is of so much service to man in art, in inventions and all his many endeavors, also gives us results that are as pernicious as these are serviceable: like all powers in the universe, it works for good and bad alike. Many people with lively and uncontrolled mental activity have compounded, for instance, the images of their own person with that of other persons, distinguished persons, it may be, of times past. Especially is this true of those young persons who are given to the reading of romances. To this also may be added the many cases that arise from time to time of persons claiming to be this or that great man, announcing themselves as prophets risen from the dead, or claiming themselves to be saviours of men, seers, and workers of miracles. All of which, according to Hobbes, is due to this compounding habit of mind, or the creative imagination. And it may be said that no theory of mind fits in so well in the explanation of insanity as that of Hobbes; this certainly is not without its significance.

But if it be so that our minds, as has been set forth above, are made up of a restless sea of images in constant motion and that, as has just been set forth, these images are subject to new combinations not found in sense, how is it that our thoughts are what they are? For this there is

ample explanation. In this connection I cannot do better than cite the immortal passage:

"When a man thinketh on anything whatsoever, his next thought after is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently. But as we have no imagination, whereof we have not formerly had sense, in whole, or in part; so we have no transition from one thought to another (save as in sense) * * * A man may oftentimes perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another. For in a discourse of our present civil war, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask, as one did, what was the value of a Roman penny? Yet the coherence to me was manifest enough. For the thought of war, introduced the thought of delivering up the king to his enemies; the thought of that, brought in the thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the thought of thirty pence, which was the price of that treason; and thence easily that malicious question, and all this in a moment of time; for thought is quick." (1)

Thus the word war calls up not only war images, but also other images that have been experienced with this, which in turn leads to still others which, if expressed to the unobservant listener, might appear altogether remote from the subject under discussion. Thus the richness of our sensuous experience renders possible an untold number of trains of thought. Apparently, then, there can be no certainty as to what train of thought will follow upon the mention of any one thing, since the image of this one thing may have been followed in our sensuous experience by many and different images. Why, then, should one train of thought not flow from a given sign as well as an-

(1) *Leviathan*, Chap. III.

other? Here comes in what is known as the law of association of ideas, according to contiguity in time and space, for which our author goes back to Aristotle. If at any time when our thoughts are said to be wandering and our mind is said to be passive, images and fancies arising as it were at random, we investigate the trains of thoughts that are then flowing in our mind, it will be found that they are really succeeding each other in accordance with these laws of association and that of motion. At such a time, our minds are accurately repeating sense impressions; but such times are rather rare, since the mind is usually under the influence of some emotion. When such is the case, our thoughts are said to be *unregulated*.

Our thoughts are, however, for the most part *regulated*. This is in accordance with the law of interest that Hobbes so definitely stated without the name here given it. Such is the case when our mental discourse is governed by some passionate thought, from which our minds are rarely free. Thus, for example, when one has constantly in mind some desired end, and thinks constantly either on the means that lead to that desired end or on the consequences that flow from the end once attained. There are, then, two ways whereby one may regulate his thoughts: that of thinking of the means that lead to the end desired and secondly, that of thinking of the results that flow from the end attained. The first power man has

in common with the beasts of the field, but the second power is characteristic of man alone.

This analysis of the thinking process is simple and free from any unnecessary subtleties. It shows again that reflective thought is the only thought that Hobbes regarded as relative to the business he has in hand. This is in keeping with his neglect of the Cartesian problem of mind and matter. This shows, too, in a most substantial way his alliance with present-day tendencies in philosophy. As parallel with the above simple statement the words of a modern thinker,¹ who espousing the evolutionary hypothesis, has made it felt in the study of mind, may be read with profit.

This explanation of thought in terms of purpose, so closely in harmony with present-day doctrines may at first seem to be out of harmony with his own statement that thought is the computation of verbal signs. But it must be remembered that this statement constitutes only an external explanation of thought and one that grows out of his emphasis upon verbal signs as marks for remembrance in our own thinking. And here Hobbes was hitting at a most important truth which certainly marks him as a keen observer. I have yet to see a just appreciation of Hobbes on this point: indeed, not a few have wondered just why Hobbes saw fit to lay such stress upon ar-

(¹) *Studies in Logical Theory*, pages 4, 10, 14, etc.

bitrary signs. The importance of this observation is made manifest in the statement of present-day psychologists. We think in terms of verbal signs; for signs are words, and words are made by the movements of the muscles, which gives the mind images known as kinæsthetic, which doubtless form the vast majority of our images and in terms of which we do most surely think. Arbitrary signs, then, play their parts in two ways: as kinæsthetic images they enable us to control our thoughts as well as to systematize our experience in words.

We have seen that Hobbes laid great stress upon the principle of association and that his analysis of thought does not differ so much from that offered to-day by those writers who have undertaken to apply the evolutionary conception to our thoughts. In consideration of this fact, it may seem strange that Hobbes has received so little attention in the field of psychology. No doubt he has gone so long without credit for the simple reason that his contributions had already been assimilated by others. His influence upon John Locke can hardly be questioned; it was greater even than Locke knew. That his doctrines were well known among thinking men, is apparent from the writings of Cudworth. Locke, however, did not take the completely Hobbistic viewpoint. Had he done this, he would not have started thought on its reactionary tendency; which we shall soon see he did. What he really

did do, consciously or unconsciously, was to compromise the positions of the intuitionists and sensationalists. Thus, while in some respects he was propounding the doctrines of Hobbes, he was none the less reasserting the doctrines of Cudworth.

To revert to Hobbes, it must be asked: Is his psychology out of harmony with his metaphysics? Or, more definitely, is not his law of interest inconsistent with his general position as to the nature of mind and its place in the universe of motion? It was found that, according to Hobbes' metaphysics of motion, the mind is really an integral part of the universe of motion and of the same essence with it; that its very constitution of mental images caused by motion places it under the complete sway of universal motion. Consistently, then, the mind has no control over its images, but on the contrary mind is merely the playground of such images as are caused in it by the motion of the universe. Now, we are told, in the law of interest, which Hobbes so definitely stated, that the mind *can* regulate and control the play of its images either by seeking the means that lead to some desired end or by imagining the consequences that flow from the end attained. Is this not giving the mind control over its trains of thought? Manifestly. Is it not, then, inconsistent in our philosopher to thus cut his mind off from the universe of which it is a homogeneous part? And again, the use of arbitrary signs, of

which he makes so much, only adds to the separation of the part from the whole. But if we are to take the position of present-day teachers, Hobbes is wise in allowing his experience of the parts to outweigh his theory of an unexperienced whole. He does not undertake to solve the insoluble riddle of the relation of the part to the whole. In his position here he has taken a stand similar to that of his neglect of the Cartesian problem. He shows, too, his alliance with Bacon. Such so-called metaphysical problems are purely theoretical, and while they have undoubtedly their own value in their own way, which Hobbes as a theorist would not controvert, they must not be confused with problems of a practical nature. Problems of psychology are practical, and they are subject to those checks that the problems of any science are subject to. While Hobbes could hardly be called an experimental psychologist, in taking this fact for granted, he took the step that rendered the appearance of experimental psychology possible.

Indeed, throughout the whole of Hobbes one thing is quite noticeable: stress is rarely laid upon theoretical difficulties; unbounding confidence is always displayed; for

"nothing is produced by reasoning aright, but general, eternal and immutable truth."⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *Leviathan* (M. III, 664).

It is, therefore, justly said that while Hobbes is correctly regarded as the founder of both associational and physiological psychology he was nevertheless a thorough-going rationalist in method. But this is bound up with his theory that philosophy must always be of a practical nature so far as results looked to are concerned. This emphasis upon the practical saved Hobbes from emphasis upon the separateness of our different sensations, the atomistic character of our experience, and naturally from the need of a uniting mind to systematize them by means of innate forms or natural faculties. The mind simply registers and retains our experience; and in terms of our past experience the future may be predicted and controlled.

II.

LOCKE: OPEN-MINDED DUALISM.

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At the close of our study of Hobbes attention was called to the dogmatic character of his method. This dogmatism was not peculiar to Hobbes; he was answered in the same kind by the even more dogmatic intuitionist, Ralph Cudworth. It was out of the futility of dogmatic assertions that the critical philosophy of Locke sprang. For Locke anticipated Kant in his critical examination of the human understanding with a view to setting forth its limitations. This is a fact beyond controversy. The manner in which Locke went at his examination is quite different from that of Kant; which gives Kant the opportunity of praising what he is pleased to term Locke's natural history of the human understanding. In consequence of his careful investigation Locke is generally spoken of as the founder of empirical psychology. He approaches the subject from the view-point of common sense, and proceeds, under the influence of Hobbes and DesCartes, as nearly as possible in harmony with the scientific knowledge of his time. He had a more or less well-defined critical theory to offer which may have influenced to some extent his work; when he had delivered himself of this, he supposed that it might then

"be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities."(¹)

Thus it will be seen that Locke's prime interest is in knowledge and its necessary and inevitable limitations, as he saw them. As knowledge for him is of ideas and their compounds, the work has much to do with psychology and has the value of showing the importance of such a science in theories of knowledge. It was incidental to this larger purpose of Locke that he espoused Hobbistic sensationalism, since he found it convenient to deny the doctrine of innate ideas; whence Locke is sometimes spoken of as the successor of Hobbes and the founder of French sensationalism. Nothing, I believe, could more adequately misrepresent Locke's actual position than such a disconnected statement. For it must not be forgotten that Locke anticipated Kant. How Locke could anticipate Kant and yet have the reputation of being a sensationalist, it is part of the purpose of this paper to show.

It is taken for granted by our author that no one will controvert the proposition that our minds are stored with images, phantasms, thoughts, etc., all of which he begs the privilege of classifying under the common term, *idea*. The idea is, then, any object of thought. That one's mind is stored

(¹) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Introd.

with an endless variety of ideas, every man is conscious to himself, and that all other men are similarly furnished in mind, more or less, is apparent from what they do and say. But whence comes the mind by this furniture, "whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety?" This is the first task for the philosopher who would discipline the human mind and bring it to know its limitations. And it is to this great task that our author directs his attention with a vigor that is not usual among philosophers. For it is by means of Hobbistic sensationism that Locke would make his first point against dogmatism.

That some men hold somewhat after the manner of Plato that certain ideas, or principles, are divinely implanted in the human mind, is a matter that our author may have at first regarded as of no great consequence. That is, if it be true, as seems to be the case, that the first book of his Essay was written last. For if it can be shown, as Locke undertakes to do, "How men, barely by the use of their *natural* faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of innate impressions," then, by the law of parsimony, the theory of innate ideas ceases to be a fruitful one. Although he does take this position at one time in his Essay, and notwithstanding the fact that it is one that he could have maintained with perfect consistency, he later adds the first

book of his famous Essay in direct refutation of the doctrine of innate ideas, which in the light of the above seems to be a work of supererogation. Perhaps the real explanation of why he added this first book lies in the fact that the work is more than a philosopher's treatise,—it is also a polemic. In that case we may regard the first book as a vigorous and direct stroke at certain prominent upholders of the intuitional doctrine in his day,—not Des Cartes, with whom Locke is in harmony, but stragglers after good old Ralph Cudworth, who so successfully “confuted the scottish atheists,” Hobbes and others. Add to this Locke's genuine antipathy for the doctrine, which he felt very strongly tended to hamper freedom of thought, and we have sufficient explanation of the publication of the first book.

Looked at from one aspect Locke's flat denial of the doctrine of innate ideas is indeed a revolutionary step; it so functioned in his day and generation and consequently it has so been treated by all historians of philosophy. But if one views it in the light of the general advance of thought, this attack seems to have come late. The destructive work had already been successfully consummated in the constructive work of Hobbes. It must further be noted that Locke in a great measure misunderstood the doctrine of innate ideas, just as the intuitionists misunderstood Locke's position. If I understand the argument of Locke, what he attacks few intuitionists would really

care to defend; while what he claims in a positive way was certainly misunderstood. Locke attacks the doctrine that the soul comes into the world ready to think, that the mind is furnished with ideas and is capable of thinking and knowing independent of sensation. This is a doctrine that Ralph Cudworth certainly would not have cared to defend. On the other hand, Locke did not mean to deny to the mind a certain kind of activity native to it. Indeed, he distinctly asserts this in more than one place. The intuition theory that Locke attacks is one *all his own*, just as the sensationalism that he defends is one all his own; in either case he was out of harmony with the generally accepted doctrine.

The contrast between Locke and Hobbes upon this one point in regard to which they are generally supposed to be in agreement cannot be stressed too much; for it is of great significance. Hobbes' denial of innate ideas is not direct; it comes incidental to his statement of a constructive program. Locke's denial of innate ideas is flat and direct; and it is made the basis of his attack upon the unbounding confidence in mind and its capabilities so characteristic of dogmatism. Strangely enough the apparently destructive work of Locke in the end proves reactionary, while Hobbes' denial of intuitionism incidental to his constructive program more successfully undermines that ancient theory than the work of

Locke. The position of Locke, of course, was not well defined. His introduction of sensationalism to replace intuitionism, clinging as he did to Des Cartes' *res cogitans*, a mind active through natural faculties, is highly inconsistent. While Locke made a great noise over it all, he was anything but thorough-going in his acceptance of sensationalism. The slightest movement in this direction is, of course, thoroughly inconsistent with his whole position. Furthermore, having destroyed so respected a theory as the doctrine of innate ideas, he replaces it with nothing better than natural faculties through which the mind works, the mind being active from the first. And this active mind is by far the most important element in his doctrine. That is to say, Locke's return to the past is of a subtle nature; he attempts to re-interpret intuitionism in terms of sensationalism. Hobbes, on the other hand, does not come at mind from the standpoint of the past, but through the term imagination; mind is mental images, images are motion, and motion explains the mind's activity, its power of retention and union. All of these are significantly left to the *powers* of mind by Locke; they are its *faculties*.

At the very outset, Locke makes his position upon this point clear and it becomes increasingly clear as his work advances. Even primary perception is dependent upon the mind's activity:

"This is certain, that whatever alterations are made in the body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, *if they are not taken notice of within*, there is no perception. * * * How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, *it takes no notice* of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing of the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet no sound is heard." (1)

No objection could be found to this statement in its proper connection; he is accurately describing what takes place in perception. So, likewise, a few paragraphs later, he makes still clearer the mind's power to order our sensation and perceptions so as to interpret them correctly; how what should really appear flat is made by the mind to appear round. But Locke does not make clear, after the manner of Hobbes, that what we have is sense correcting sense, although he has every opportunity to do so in his work. And it is in looking at the above passage in the light of all that he has to say that its full meaning is brought out. The mind, independent, originaive, is possessed of natural faculties; it waits merely for the objects of thought to be gained through sensation by means of these natural faculties. That there are no innate ideas means simply that

(1) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Chap. IX, Pars. 3 and 4.

ideas cannot exist before sensation; there must be action upon the senses by some stimuli, motions of external objects, first of all. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non antea fuerit in sensu*; for the mind is an unwritten sheet, *tabula rasa*, antecedent to sensation. We do not think, we do not know, before sensation for the good reason that we have nothing to think and nothing to know; but not because there is no mind.

It is quite evident that Locke's ill-defined position here is capable of being stressed in two quite different ways, leading to two entirely different interpretations of his philosophy. If Locke is denying the mind's original activity in his statement that there are no innate ideas, then Condillac and his school have carried Locke to his implicit conclusions. If on the other hand Locke in declaring that the mind's activity *waits* on sensation be an assertion of the mind's activity, then Kant is his true interpreter. In the one case, Locke, the sensationalist, is thinking of the brain; in the other he is not. Locke holds that there is a thinking substance in some way connected with us, in nature active and opposed to passive matter, which, nevertheless, in some way ordered of God must be awakened into its activity by sensation. As to the nature of this substance he is not sure; it may even be material, since it is within the power of Divinity to endow matter in such a way as to oppose it to base matter by the mere

fact of this endowment. It is clear that Locke's effort to take the middle road between Hobbes and Cudworth places him in a position not easily defended. We must simply take his word for it that a mind has no more to be always thinking to exist than a stomach has always to be digesting to exist; as the one waits for food the other may wait on sensation for its objects of thought. In other words thought is not the essence of mind for Locke, but rather a function of the mind that can be called into play. But is this position tenable? Either thought is the essence of mind, or he must give up his *res cogitans*. But Locke compromisingly clings to both sensationalism and Cartesian dualism. All told this is not surprising; for Locke, throughout his entire work, is constantly confusing the mind as known to him in experience with his theoretical *res cogitans*. That the one is contradictory of the other is clearly evident.

If the mind be, as our author declares, a *tabula rasa*,

"How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the *materials* of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the *materials* of thinking. These two are the fountains of

knowledge, from whence all the ideas that we have, or can naturally have, do spring."⁽¹⁾

It matters not to what heights the mind may attain in all its varied activity, it stirs not one jot beyond the ideas so gained. All lofty constructions of the imagination must be reduced to these same simple primary elements of our knowledge. All of this, of course, suggests Hobbes at once. But there is a significant difference between them even here. In Locke the "materials of thinking" alone are gained from experience; while in Hobbes, on the other hand, the mind itself is the product of experience. It is quite possible, therefore, that Locke, believing as he did in the mind as the orderer of our experience, regarded his position here as independent of Hobbes. Certainly it is agreed by all critics that Locke reached his conclusions from his own observations, or he would never have tabulated them as his own. Hence it would generally be claimed that Locke was influenced by Hobbes to a very slight degree. There is no doubt, however, but that Locke had read his Hobbes.

Experience is of two kinds; that that has to do with external sensible things and that that has to do with the internal operations of the mind. The former is called sensation, while the latter is called reflection. Sensation is antecedent to re-

⁽¹⁾ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. I, Par. 2.

flection. From sensation, "such an impression, or motion made in the parts of the body as produces some perception in the understanding," the most of our ideas spring.

"Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those *ideas* we do have of yellow, white, cold, heat, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which are called sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. * * * (The) other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas," reflection, "that notice that the mind takes of its own states and operations, by which it has ideas of the same,"⁽¹⁾

sustains in a measure the same relation to our mental operations that sensation does to external sensible objects.

Here in reflection we find the same activity of the mind that was stressed a few pages back in primary perception. The mind is active in the same way in the perception of sensations that it is in the perception of mental operations in reflection. There is no need to stress that point again here; the difference is one of degree. It must be understood, however, that there will be found in Locke other explanations of the mind's synthetic character, for he is not always consistent. But not to take note of his position above and its significance would, it seems to me, be to

(¹) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. I, Pars. 3 and 4.

ultimately misinterpret the general trend of Locke's message in psychology. Quite generally commentators of Locke are misleading here. They say that the mind is passive in the reception of simple ideas and active in the creation of complex ones. And this is just what Locke does say at one place, but Locke's general position cannot be got at through that one statement. Throughout the whole of his psychology there is a continual assumption of the mind as an independent, self-existent, active entity, marshalling sensations and ideas alike. The mind may be said to be unconscious in its action in primary perception, in which case Locke suggests the *petites perceptions* of Leibnitz or anticipates the Kantian doctrine as to the unconscious activity of the imagination in perception. Indeed, the function of Locke's understanding is in a great way given over to that of the imagination in Kant. Their activity in primary perception in the interpretation of independent sensation is one and the same. If the commentators mean merely to say that the mind is relatively passive in the reception of simple ideas, that is, as compared with its activity in the creation of complex ones, why that is quite correct. But my contention is that commentators in stressing the importance of Locke's revolutionary doctrine fail to notice the importance of his reactionary trend. Locke simply took for granted his soul with its natural faculties and

original activity. To question its existence never so much as entered his mind as a reasonable hypothesis. In my opinion French sensationalism gave a turn that would have caused him sleepless nights could he ever have fully realized it. The fact that Locke says that reflection might go by the name of an *internal sense* only doubles his emphasis upon mind. For the mind whose attention is necessary and presupposed even in primary perception continues more and more to display its activity. It is active in reflection; to its activity are due all our ideas whether they be complex ideas, ideas of relation or ideas of abstraction. For as we shall see later, the mind displays its activity through these natural faculties, or powers, of compounding, abstracting, etc.

To continue with the statement of Locke's position:

"These two, I say, viz., external, material things, as objects of sensation, and the operations of our minds within, as objects of reflection, are to me, the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings."⁽¹⁾

Through sensation and reflection from the above named sources the mind receives its simple ideas, the ultimate foundation of all our knowledge, its unanalysible elements, out of which are created all other ideas, whether they be the idea of the self, the external world, or God.

⁽¹⁾ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Chap. I., Par. 4.

To examine sensation. Any external object of which the mind takes notice is for Locke possessed of certain real qualities, as solidity, extension, figure, motion, and certain subjective qualities. The former are inseparable from the external object and are of its very essence, while the latter, on the contrary, are separable from the object and, although they are commonly supposed to reside in the object as is the case with primary qualities, just referred to, they are for Locke effects in the observer. The one Locke called primary qualities and the other secondary, and despite the fact that this distinction did not originate with Locke, the terms which he applied to them have taken a permanent place in philosophic discussion, a witness to the important place of their author. Now, ideas are produced in the mind by the action of these external bodies upon the sense, the internal parts being set in motion by the particles of the external bodies, *provided the mind attends*. That the ideas thus aroused in the mind in response to such external stimuli should in any wise resemble the external cause is unnecessary and gratuitous; they need no more resemble their cause than words need resemble the things they name. Nevertheless, it is quite true that our ideas of primary qualities do correspond to the qualities in external bodies, in some way or other, but our ideas of secondary qualities do not; these exist in the things themselves only as modes

of primary qualities. In these statements Locke is trying very hard to be consistent with the advance of science in his day. Elsewhere he writes in the same connection significantly,

"Ideas it is certain I have, and God is the original cause of my having them; but how I came by them * * * in this I frankly confess my ignorance."⁽¹⁾

Locke's position here is that of an undogmatic mind: this is certainly beyond all question, but it is essentially quite different from that of Hobbes though this may not at first be so apparent. In Hobbes we have seen that there is no disposition to make anything of the Cartesian problem; to a certain extent it may be said that Locke is in the same case. To his credit, he does neglect the problem to some extent. But this is inconsistent with his general attitude towards mind; for mind and matter are for him heterogeneous, while for Hobbes they were not. Hobbes, therefore, is justified in his neglect of the problem, while Locke is not. It is for this reason that we may overlook the phenomenology of Hobbes, of which some have seen fit to make too much capital. But the case of Locke is quite different. He has not only the two worlds of mind and matter but in agreeing with Hobbes that our own ideas do not have to agree with their objects he has introduced as a veil a system of ideas that intervene between

(¹) *Examination of Malebranche*, Pars. 10-16, quoted from Vol. I, p. 192; *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

his two worlds. The significance of this three-world position of Locke was fully realized by Irish wit, when Berkeley stepped from the world of matter by means of this newly discovered world of ideas into the world of mind. Had it not been for Locke's intervening ideas, or rather had Locke not given the significance that he did to these ideas, there would never have been the excuse that there undoubtedly was for Berkeley's psychological idealism. For it arises out of the simple Lockean definition of knowledge: and how it does we shall see later in our study of Berkeley.

Let us examine these ideas and their genesis and see what light they throw upon the question of Locke, the sensationalist, and Locke, the mentalist. Ideas are of two kinds: simple and complex. The former constitute the unanalysable elements of all that we know, or can know; they come into the mind only as above set forth by sensation and reflection, outer and inner perception. As was pointed out above, it is usual to say that simple ideas are received by the mind in a passive state: whereas complex ones are the creation of the mind's own activity. There can be no objection to this statement of the case so long as it is remembered that the mind is always potentially active for Locke, and never passive when it has something to think or know. Relatively, then, the mind is passive here in contradistinction to its greater activity in the higher mental processes, or what he calls natural faculties. Simple ideas

are received either from without or within, when the mind attends to some object, external or mental; complex ideas are constructs of the mind, formed out of simple ideas, with which the mind has the power by means of its faculties to deal as it will. It may construct the most lofty conceptions, the most sublime ideas, but the most exalted wit cannot come at a simple idea by any other method than that of reception through sensation and reflection. As the mind has no power to create a simple idea, so likewise it has no power to destroy one. Simple ideas come into the mind through one sense, through several senses, by reflection, and by reflection and sensation together. Thus the primary quality, *solidity*, comes into the mind by the single sense, touch; by reflection alone we come into the possession of the ideas of willing and thinking, while by reflection and sensation we gain the idea of power, pain and others. Simple ideas are subject to certain limitations; these one must gain and must gain them as they are given in his experience, they cannot be altered. On the other hand in the case of complex ideas, the mind is free and originative. It can proceed as it will; for the reason that our complex ideas do not have to conform to external objects. Simple ideas are real, adequate and, for the most part, true; while on the other hand complex ideas need not be either real or adequate or true. Both simple and complex ideas may be either clear or

obscure; simple ideas in the strength and freshness of their reception into the mind are certainly clear, though if the perception is imperfect, or the memory weak, they may be obscure. Complex ideas are dependent upon simple ones for their clearness. The validity of all science rests upon the validity of simple ideas.

Of the ideas classified above, simple ideas are the work of the mind and sense; nothing is clearer than this. While sensation is necessary for the possibility of ideas; their coming into being depends, as we have seen, upon the activity of the mind. The mind must attend in sensation that we may have simple ideas at all just as it must attend in reflection that we may have simple ideas. All other ideas are the product of the mind alone. The position of Locke here suggests that of Kant whose faculty of imagination organizes not only perceptions under the pure forms of the mind, but even the crude data of sensation under the forms of space and time. In Locke as well as in Kant simple and complex ideas alike are the work of mind. In the one the mind acts through natural faculties, while in the other the mind has as its instruments *forms*.

Here we come to that part of the work of Locke which, while it may be merely a matter of emphasis, seems to me to be much more than this, Locke's careful treatment of the faculties of mind, which marks him off clearly from Hobbes. They

are for Locke something more than mere names for the manner images play in the mind. While Locke is careful to have us understand that they are not beings or agents, he discusses them as *powers* of the mind. Here again we come upon Locke's leaning toward intuitionism as against Hobbes' thorough-going materialism. The matter may be approached in two ways: through a consideration of the thinking substance, and that of the law of association. An emphasis upon mind substance to the exclusion of a formal explanation of mind seems to make it clear that Locke can have but one meaning for faculties.

What this thinking substance is, we do not know and cannot know, but one of two things is true: either it is an immaterial substance superadded to matter, or it is matter. It rests as much with spiritualists to show why their hypothesis is acceptable as it does with materialists to show that theirs is.

"For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being should, if He pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as He thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception and thought," (1)

but, he significantly adds,

"Though, as I think I have proved, it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first thinking Being", (1)

(1) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, Ch. III, Par. 6.

which so far as I can see rests Locke's case. Still he would retain an open mind in the matter, as may be seen:

"It is a point which seems to me to be put out of reach of our knowledge,"⁽¹⁾

but, he adds, because we find one hypothesis inconceivable that is no reason for throwing ourselves violently into the contrary one, which is "an unfair way some men take with themselves".

When Locke has completed his consideration his position is no longer in doubt, despite the fact that he professes an open mind. He defends the Cartesian *res cogitans*, as we have already had opportunity to discover. And it is in this thinking substance that we find the originaive powers of union, abstraction, comparing, etc. For these are the instruments of the directing mind and it is through these powers that its activity is displayed. It has been claimed above that these are not, as they were with Hobbes, merely names for the behavior of mind, purely descriptive in nature, though they do have this character also. Indeed, it must be here understood once and for all that Locke here as elsewhere accurately describes the mind's activities; the fault is to be found not so much with Locke's description as with his theory. It is contended that the very fact that Locke feels it necessary merely to describe these activities as

⁽¹⁾ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, Ch. III, Par. 6.

faculties makes clear his theory of mind. He could have gone into a causal explanation of mental phenomena. Notice how carefully Hobbes explains retention in terms of images that persist through the law of motion; how carefully he explains the mind's synthetic activity in terms of the law of association of ideas. What has Locke to say here? These are all powers, or natural faculties, that the mind has through which and in which, its activities are made manifest. Here again Locke betrays his mentalism.

But most striking of all the neglected opportunities that presented themselves to Locke by which he might have made his position clear, is that of his failure to employ the principal of association. It cannot be said that he was unacquainted with this law; for in a negative way he calls particular attention to it, when considering its unfortunate aspect as displayed in the "connection of ideas wholly owing to chance and custom" and the ill effects that flow from these associations of a peculiarly subjective character. It may be that Locke did not emphasize the law in a positive way for the reason that he anticipated what Hume later did. For the method that Locke uses to explain subjective coherence is the same that Hume used to explain all creations of the imagination including Locke's self, external world and Creator. However that may be it is found that in

most cases Locke concealed the operation of this law under other names, but principally under the faculties of the thinking substance. If Locke did not understand the full significance of this law, the reason that he did not is plain enough, his predilections in favor of the Cartesian *res cogitans* and his good intuitionism (despite his wonderful assault on innate ideas), really left no place for such a law in his psychology. In this connection it may be noted that interesting light is here thrown on Locke's attitude towards the principle by his introductory words:

"Some of our ideas have a *natural* correspondence and connection one with another; *it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these, and to hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their particular beings.* Besides this there is another connection of ideas wholly owing to *chance or custom.*"

That is to say, the true ideas though gained from sensation and the correspondence between them can be intuited by the reason just as the innate ideas of Ralph Cudworth were. One of the prime functions of the reason is to preserve the integrity of this agreement against the on-slaughts of false connections "wholly owing to chance and custom". The intuitionism of Locke has been noticed by more than one commentator. A more definite statement of it could hardly be called for.

It is generally thought that Locke, far from being an adherent of the faculty psychology, actually

(¹) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. XXXIII, Par. 5.

did much in opposition to such a doctrine. This, it must be admitted, is partially true. Locke did attack the theory that a mental faculty is an independent agent. Here, as in the case of his attack upon the theory of innate ideas, he attacks not the genuine theory, but a popular misconception of it. His position is made clear in a discussion of volition:

"But in all these it is not one *power* that operates on another: but it is the mind that operates, and exerts these powers; it is the man that does the action; it is the agent that has power, or is able to do. For powers are relations, not agents," etc. ⁽¹⁾

While these words have a particular pertinency in his discussion of freedom, their bearing upon the general position is quite apparent. For the agent, or man, is always identified with his active directing mind.

The activity of the mind observed in perception is more and more evident the higher the faculties discussed. Primary perception man has in common with all animals of the field; but the faculty of abstraction belongs to man alone, and is highly developed only in men of great intellectual power.

Perception is "the first *operation* of all intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge in our minds". The understanding displays its power in perception of ideas, in the perception of the signification of signs, in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. The

⁽¹⁾ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. XXI.

powers here set forth are those of the understanding proper. There is another power that shares with the understanding the activities of the soul, namely, the will. It is from the observation of these faculties that the mind derives the idea of power. How Locke's use of these powers has led him to emphasize the mind's activity has already been referred to.

Retention is a power that the mind has of keeping ideas actually under observation, called contemplation. The mind also has "the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, after imprinting have disappeared". Thus what constitutes the essence of mind for Hobbes, namely its conservation of experience, is for Locke merely a power of mind. But memory must not be literally interpreted as a storehouse of ideas; Locke carefully, if naively, fortifies himself against any such in the following words:

"This laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more but this,—that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has had once, with this additional perception annexed to them, that *it has had them before*. * * * They (ideas) are actually nowhere; but only there is an ability in the mind when it will to revive them again", etc.⁽¹⁾

While this is true, there are cases where this power of the mind is useless; for the ideas have disappeared.

(¹) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. X, Par. 2.

"Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often die before us; and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching; where, though the brass and marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours; and if not sometimes refreshed, vanish and disappear."⁽¹⁾

Locke contends that our ideas disappear; this was for him a matter of common experience, and one that could not be controverted. Here, in a way, he opposed Hobbes. While our author contends that ideas decay, Hobbes, on the other hand, holds that our ideas would never decay in fact, but that to say that they decay is merely another way of saying that they are crowded out of the field of consciousness by other and newer impressions only for the time being; their persistence in the mind being due to the fundamental law of motion, the motion of the internal parts of the body must be counteracted by other new motions from without or the internal parts themselves must have been destroyed. This retention of images is the essence of mind for Hobbes; it is merely a power, or the accident, of mind for Locke. The Hobbistic theory of mind as a moving sea of images serves him in good stead when he comes to explain what is for Locke a strange phenomenon, that is, how ideas

"start up in our minds of their own accord and offer themselves to the understanding; and very often are roused

⁽¹⁾ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. X, Par. 5.

and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight, by turbulent and tempestuous passions." (2)

This our author allows to disturb him very little; the instances that are met with belong to the mind in a relaxed state. In an active state the mind orders to the fore certain dormant ideas through the power of the will, or even seeks out some hidden idea by a careful search. All of which goes to show that Locke in his discussion of the retention of ideas and their recurrence in the mind is disposed to assign to the power of an unanalysed conception their control, which is in striking contrast with Hobbes in his careful analysis of mental control. Locke points out carefully the value of memory, without which man would be helpless; but not once does he seem to appreciate the conception of mind as being essentially memory.

Very different from the faculties discussed above are those of discerning, comparing and compounding. The function of perception and retention was to receive and keep the ideas with which the last three faculties are to deal in quite different ways. Discernment is that power of the mind that enables it to distinguish clearly between ideas; its importance cannot be overestimated.

"On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general propositions, which have passed for innate

(2) *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Ch. X, Par. 7.

truths; because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent impute it wholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it *perceives* two ideas to be the same, or different."⁽¹⁾

Are we any wiser for such a discussion of this faculty? Without in any way denying that Locke made a positive contribution here it is just as evident that for him the sensation of difference is a non-sensuous element. This is one of the dividing lines between intuitionism and sensationalism and Locke is plainly on the side of intuition.

Comparing is that power of the mind whereby it compares its ideas one with another in respect of extent, degree, time, place, or any other circumstance upon which are dependent all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under relation, which is of vast extent, as our author makes clear. But here again Locke makes it clear that relation belongs to ideas in the mind which is intuited by the mind as it examines and compares its ideas.

Compounding is that power of the mind whereby it joins together simple ideas received from sensation and reflection, creating thereby complex ideas. Under this head is included the enlarging of ideas, which is simply the combining of ideas of the same kind, not at first apparent. Here, as has been pointed out above, Locke misses a most

⁽¹⁾ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II, Chap. XI, Par. 1.

excellent opportunity to employ to advantage the principle of association of ideas with which he was certainly not unfamiliar. The theory that one experience has the power to call up another and that this is the fundamental basis of mind would, I feel, have been repulsive to Locke, whose whole work is so closely allied with the conception of an undivided active thinking substance.

The highest faculty of the mind is that of abstraction, the power that the mind has of separating the ideas that it has joined, or found joined, in some particular thing as perceived by the mind. Whiteness belongs both to snow and chalk and can be abstracted from them. This the mind does of necessity; but for this faculty of abstraction, says Locke, names would be endless. This is the power of mind that marks man off from the brute just as perception, according to Locke, marks all sentient creatures off from lower forms of life. Here again Locke plainly avoids a scientific explanation of the behavior of the mind. What might have been gone into and analysed is lumped as a power of mind. Locke's conception of an abstract idea as a mental construction is enough to convict him of mentalism even if there were no other data at our disposal.

It can hardly be said Locke placed much emphasis upon the atomistic character of our sensuous experience, certainly not after the manner of Hume. His conception of substance, whether

material or spiritual, held within it sufficient explanation of how qualities are held together. Rather did he emphasize the mere fact that sensation is a necessary element in experience and this he did in a manner in no wise different either from his predecessor, Ralph Cudworth, with whose doctrines he must have been most thoroughly familiar, or from his renowned successor, Immanuel Kant. But, as we have clearly shown, the non-sensuous element in Locke is greatly predominant. This he has made clear in two ways: by the continual emphasis upon the mind as an undivided, original, active, directing substance and by his disposition to stress the non-sensory element in his discussion of the faculties, or powers, of mind. Locke clearly anticipated Kant, and the chief element of difference that distinguishes the work of Kant from that of Locke is that that was introduced by his two successors, Berkeley and Hume.

III.

BERKELEY: DOGMATIC SPIRITUALISM.



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BERKELEY: DOGMATIC SPIRITUALISM.

Berkeley, like many other young men of his time, was led into philosophy through the reading of Locke. And yet two minds could not have been more unlike than those of Berkeley and Locke; Berkeley did not have that openness of mind so characteristic of Locke. The position of compromise that Locke had taken was not for him. Locke's reference of the secondary qualities to the sentient mind as well as his broad use of the term idea at once suggested to Berkeley's mind further development. Where Locke had restrained thought to those things that the mind seemed capable of dealing with, Berkeley gave wings to his fancy. Locke's Critique of the Human Understanding was totally without results for him. Laying greater stress upon mind, he extended its activity to all of reality; for it is plain that there is no reality without mind. Matter melts under his logic into sensuous experience; back of which stands mind. There is in all the history of thought no more brilliant example of reason's being led captive by emotion.

Singularly enough the weapon that Berkeley used in his attack upon Locke is good English nominalism. He lays significant errors at the

door of Locke's theory of abstraction, "the opinion that the mind hath a power of forming abstract ideas or notions of things." After carefully setting forth what he understands by abstraction, he declares with characteristic frankness and vigor;

"Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell. For myself, I find I have indeed a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the idea of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse, I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color. Likewise the idea of a man that I frame to myself, must be either a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middle sized man." (1)

As for being able to have an abstract idea such as humanity, or any other abstract idea, our author absolutely denies his ability to do so. Any image that he can call up in his imagination is that of some particular man, or member of a class. What he claims in regard to himself he holds will be found true of most men, provided they be not learned;

"and there is ground to think that most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend to *abstract notions*. * * * (And those who claim this power) are confined only to the learned," (1)

(1) *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*—Introduction, Par. 10.

and citing Locke's case of the triangle that

"must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. * * * to give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas,"⁽²⁾

he declares:

"If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for anyone to perform."⁽²⁾

It must be understood that Berkeley does not deny that we make use of general terms but that there are such things as abstract general ideas,—that general ideas are not such mental creations as Locke would have us think. Our use of such general terms can be easily explained, as must be admitted after the following citation:

"If we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort."⁽¹⁾

That is to say, we think in examples. At this point Berkeley suggests Kant; for his schema, by which sense and reason get into touch with each

⁽²⁾ *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*—Introduction, Par. 13.

⁽¹⁾ *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introduction, Par. 12.

other, is a somewhat vague particular doing duty as a universal. But this comparison would be much to Kant's disadvantage, owing to Berkeley's simplicity of statement, which when properly interpreted is very near to our present-day explanation of the same.

Continuing his attack upon abstract ideas, he declares his inability to see the value of such ideas either for communication or for the enlargement of knowledge. Then, too, if we are to take the words of Locke seriously, abstracting is no easy operation of the mind, one far too difficult for the tender ages and one for which adults find but small opportunity. The source of the whole trouble for Locke, according to Berkeley, lies in language; had there been no universal signs, there would have been no thought of abstraction. Because we have such signs, Locke would give us such ideas, which for our author does not follow; our images, or ideas, are particular. But this does not interfere with the general accurate use of our signs. To say that it did would mean that ideas and words had to correspond, which is by no means the case; this would be to limit the usefulness of words. Words play the part that ideas may have once played in arousing passions in another; the promise of good things calls up no image, though we are moved by it. Even proper names are not intended always to call up the image of the persons to whom they refer;

"For example, when a schoolmen tells me 'Aristotle hath said it,' all I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name."⁽¹⁾

In conclusion our author declares that if it be correct as according to Locke that abstraction marks man off from the brute, then he himself must be so classified; for he can discover in himself no such power of mind.

So much space has been given to Berkeley's attack upon Locke for good reasons. Aside from its intrinsic importance as a defense of nominalism from the psychological viewpoint, it was regarded by Hume as one of the great contributions to thought, and consequently he was influenced by it very much,—as we shall see. But to say nothing of its place in Berkeley's argument for the present, it deserves particular attention for another reason. His difference from Locke at this point deserves more than a casual explanation; for it was more than a mere whim. That Berkeley was a good psychologist, few would deny; his exposition of vision and his general discussion of the mind and its operations, when separated from his metaphysics, place him in the front rank of psychologists. He, after Hobbes, is the first man to clearly set forth mind as the power of one experience to call up another. His ability to render these contributions was due to the fact that he

⁽¹⁾ *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*,
Intro., Par. 20.

followed the method so earnestly urged by Locke. He went to experience, thereby proving himself a good Lockean and a good member of the English school. And yet, the results of their investigation appear to be totally different. Berkeley holds that the generality of an idea is in its representative relation; Locke, that this generality is a construction of the mind. Recent investigation has shown that men are divided into two distinct classes; strong visualizers and poor ones.

While Berkeley deserves the name of psychologist, this is by accident rather than otherwise, despite his work in this field his prime interests lay not there. So, too, his brilliant defense of nominalism must not be regarded as an effort to uphold that doctrine for its own sake. His motive lay elsewhere. This attack upon the theory of abstraction looked to his fundamental position in metaphysics. For the greatest of all abstractions is matter; and with the overthrow of Locke's doctrine materialism seemed undermined. Hence Berkeley's great enthusiasm for nominalism. We touch this merely in passing; the subject will later be taken up in its logical order.

The significance of Locke's theory of knowledge is best got at through his doctrine of ideas; for we can know ideas and their compounds only. That ideas are the only objects of our knowledge, Berkeley readily accepts. And he proceeds at once to substantiate as well as to enlarge upon their already broad meaning. Thus, when I see an object,

or in any way sense one by some other sense, what I know is the idea which is said to be impressed on the senses; when I reflect, viewing the passions and operations of the mind, what I know here again, is ideas; and when I call up in the imagination any of the above formed ideas, what I know is still ideas and nothing different; for they all alike are perceptions of the mind. That is to say, all natural phenomena, whether actually perceived, remembered or imagined, are to be known as ideas. This use of the term idea, which Berkeley inherited from good old John Locke, helped him to melt phenomena and the world back of it into sensuous experience. The signification of the experience of the external world became lost in that of the term idea; for what we call a thing is nothing but a collection of ideas, which the mind has made.

"Thus, for example, a certain color, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together are accounted one distinct thing signified by the name *apple*." (1)

Thus Berkeley clearly points out that the mind creates reality out of data gained through sensation. If, now, there be such things as sensations, *i. e.*, colors, tastes, etc., if ideas exist and are known, there must be some knower, or perceiver. This is another consequence for Berkeley, which, however, did not follow for Hume, as we shall see.

(1) *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Rationale of Principles. Par. 1.

"This perceiving active being is what I call MIND, SPIRIT, SOUL, or MYSELF." By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived,—for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived."⁽¹⁾

And this, as Berkeley feels, is a statement that all men will allow;

"Neither our thoughts nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind";⁽¹⁾

for their very existence depends on this relation to mind, perception. So, too, for our author, it is just as evident, and equally reasonable, that

"the various sensations, or *ideas imprinted on the sense*, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in the mind perceiving them. * * * *For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived*, that is to me *perfectly unintelligible*. Their *esse* is *percipi*."⁽¹⁾

This very strikingly precludes Cartesian dualism; for it would be contradictory to say that certain things exist outside of my mind, which my ideas represent. This, in the light of Berkeley's argument, would be to declare that colors cannot be seen and that hard things are intangible.

This reply to Des Cartes and Locke and all those who defend the representative theory of knowledge, is, it seems, quite conclusive. Therefore the *esse* of the external world is, as the *esse* of our images, merely *percipi*, and there is no

⁽¹⁾ *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Rationale of Principles, Pars. 2 and 3.

substance but the *res cogitans* of Des Cartes. Thus the ideas that Locke had thought of as intervening between the world of mind and the external world, proved to be all there is of an external world. If ideas are the objects of our knowledge, what use is there for another system of things? Thus we see, and it is not so illogical, how Berkeley looks upon the external world, but we must investigate how he came into this position in more detail.

It was in the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities that Berkeley found his ground already well prepared for his labors. Though this distinction has become so well associated with the name of Locke, it belongs by equal and greater right to Des Cartes, Galileo, and, as we have seen, to Hobbes, to say nothing of Democritus. This distinction Berkeley completely denies and that, too, in a way that enabled him to play havoc with the conception of corporeal substance, as we have just seen. The position of Locke at this point, cautious and wavering, did not appeal to Berkeley, even though held by a philosopher whom he professed to greatly admire; nothing could be cited more characteristic of either philosopher than that of their position at this point. In fact we are led to believe that Berkeley admires the position of the plain man here who takes as a matter of course that both qualities are present in the external thing, more than he does

that of Locke and Des Cartes. But so great is the evidence, he would have us believe, for the subjectivity of secondary qualities that even cautious philosophers and scientists admit them as such and that, too, when they are in the same moment defending that inert senseless substance called matter.

This is certainly material at hand for Berkeley. For, as he essays to show, and that, too, without much ado, all the arguments applicable in the one case apply with equal force in the other so far as subjectivity goes. For him there is no half-way ground. If color is dependent upon the perceiving mind, motion and extension are likewise, and no less. For primary and secondary qualities alike are subjective; in either case *esse* is *percipi*.

But our author professes an open mind. For the sake of argument, he grants to these defenders of corporeal substance that, if the mind deals with these secondary qualities in a way that it does not with the primary, then it must be admitted that they have their case. This is a matter open to investigation. Taking up one after another of the primary qualities, he finds himself unable to represent any one of them to himself in his imagination apart from concrete experience; they cannot be separated or abstracted. Wherever he calls up extension or motion, there he finds that not only that it is some concrete, particular case of motion, but also that it has some shape, or

color, etc. That is, the mind treats the primary qualities in no wise differently from what it does the secondary

"In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else."⁽¹⁾

The fault of these philosophers consists in the fact that they come to persuade themselves that the mind has this power of abstracting at all, an error that, as was pointed out above, has grown out of the abuse of language by philosophical writers, such for instance as thinking that ideas must correspond to signs.

Ideas, then, are not caused in our minds by some external object, as set forth by Hobbes, Democritus, Locke and others. Inert, senseless matter, even if there were such a substance, which our author denies, as seen above, has no such power over our ideas. In thus striking at external matter, which for Hobbes is the cause of ideas and therefore their objective coherence upon which the law of association is ultimately based, Berkeley is not out of harmony with himself, though it so appears. But he goes even further than this. One idea has no power over another to call it up; for it is contrary to the very nature of the idea, by reason of its passive character, that it should possess any power or agency of this kind:

(1) *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Rationale of Principles, Par. 10.

"To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived." (1)

This is true not only of our ideas of the imagination, mental images, but also of our ideas of sense, perceptions. There is no such thing as either objective or subjective coherence, it appears from what our author says; but, he says:

"We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is, therefore, some Cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them." (1)

If the cause of our ideas and their coherence is found neither in nature nor in the ideas themselves,

"it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit."

Any human being as such an incorporeal mind has power to call up ideas in his imagination; such are the ideas of reflection, or images. As to those other ideas of sense, or as we say, perceptions, these are not under the control of human minds; their appearance rests upon the will of a more powerful agent than ourselves, the Eternal Creator. The ideas he impresses upon us are what ignorant men call the external world:

(1) *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*,
Rationale of Principles, Pars. 25, 26.

"The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series,—the admirable connection whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the *laws of nature*; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things."⁽¹⁾

A better passage than the last given could not be cited to show that while Berkeley makes no conscious use of the law of association of ideas, as do Hobbes and Hume, preferring rather to conceal it under other terms, that despite this, no one more thoroughly understood it. That is to say, he does what Locke did in a way; he allows his preconceptions to influence him in the selection of terms. Little use there was for Berkeley to do this. His works are strewn from one end to the other with evidences that he consciously or unconsciously looked upon the mind in much the same way as did Hobbes and Hume. If one would be thoroughly convinced that the modern conception of mind, the power of one experience to call up another, is a fruitful one, then let him go read Berkeley's *Essay on Vision*.

The power of the human mind to call up ideas in the imagination is called the will; whereas the power of the mind to perceive the impressed ideas

⁽¹⁾ *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Rationale of Principles, Par. 30.

of sense as well as those that have called up in the imagination is denominated the understanding. It is through the avenue of the will that the mind really manifests its activity. Those who question the power of the will to control ideas need only carefully observe the operation of their own mind for confirmation of the doctrine. To speak of unthinking agents exciting these ideas exclusive of volition is contrary to reason, according to our author. Thus it would seem that these great faculties of the mind are powers indeed, not mere names for the behavior of images in our minds,—they are the real powers of an active soul substance.

It will be noticed that while our author overthrows the representative theory of knowledge, showing to his complete satisfaction that in knowing our ideas we are knowing all the objects of knowledge, since there are no external things with which our ideas may or may not agree, he nevertheless keeps the distinction between the world of sensuous experience and that of the imagination, realizing the value of such a distinction. He does not make clear, however, one point that Hume makes something of later, that is, whether the mind can of its own volition create new ideas, other than the ones that it has had in experience. His attack upon abstraction is, it seems, apart from this point; it is the accident rather than the essence that our ideas must have the concrete look, that is so far as our having to have them

first as impression goes. To be clear, owing to the closeness of all objects of knowledge the question of the priority of sense to reflection loses its real significance. And yet, owing to the fact that Berkeley consistently maintained a distinction between our ideas of sense and those of reflection, he should not be called a subjectivist.

Whatever may be said of this one aspect of the subject, Berkeley certainly makes it clear that so far as our understanding goes when we conceive ideas we do the same thing that we do when we perceive. Perception and conception are of the same nature, the only difference being that in the one case a more powerful will than that of the individual brings up ideas for his perception with a vividness that corresponds to its greater power; while on the other hand the individual will calls up the idea of its own motion. But in either case the mind must be active in perception or there are no ideas.

The doctrine of Berkeley again suggests Kant; for is not this the task that he really set himself to? an explanation of the close relationship that exists between perception and conception. There are those, who while they by no means subscribe to the Berkleyan doctrine are prone to admire these straightforward, consistent explanations of Irish wit more than they feel disposed to extend the Copernican revolution in thought. The priority of sensation has small significance for Berkeley; ideas of imagination need not be the

copies of those of sense; they are not causally related, but both exist merely in as far as they are perceived. This is not very different from what Kant tried to do. He held that the phenomena that we have in perception are the unconscious creation of the imagination's activity just as our conceptions are its conscious creation. The fact that our sensations and perceptions have to be subjected to unification under the forms space and time is not to the point, as this has to do merely with the machinery of Kant's psychology. The point here made is that Kant and Berkeley each tried to do the same thing,—get in behind mechanism; that the statement of Berkeley is valuable at least for its simplicity.

There is much in the philosophy of Berkeley that suggests the general position of Hobbes. For both the fundamental nature of images in our mind and perceptions of the external world is the same. In Hobbes images of the mind as well as phantasms of sense are dependent upon motion of the internal parts of the body; in the one case the stimuli are present, in the other case, removed; while for Berkeley ideas of sense no less than ideas of the imagination are dependent absolutely upon the activity of mind; in the one case the mind is that of God and in the other that of the individual mind to whom it is given to have ideas. The external world, which is a vast system of motion for Hobbes, is for Berkeley the unlimited field of the operation of the mind of God. This

fundamental likeness, concealed only in terms, is not without reasonable explanation. This is to be found in their introspective experimental investigation.

Considering this likeness in psychology, it is not surprising that while the one extended the domain of sense over that of the imagination, the imagination being merely decaying sense, that the other should extend the domain of mind over that of sense; for the operation of calling up an idea in the mind and experiencing a percept of an external thing differs only in that one is a voluntary while the other is an involuntary experience. It is true that one is a more vivid idea than the other, but they are nevertheless of the same nature fundamentally. The one no less than the other is a perception of an idea by the mind and nothing more.

Too much cannot be made of this similarity between the most uniformly and consistently spiritual philosopher and the most consistent and uniform defender of materialism. It goes far towards marking the fundamental likeness that underlies all interpretations of the universe when we have robbed ourselves of anthropomorphic conceptions and sensuous verbiage only to come into the possession of the richer heritage of the more exact terms of a scientific terminology. So, too, nothing could better illustrate the significance of terms in the history of thought.

It is well to bear constantly in mind this fundamental similarity, but when we turn to their doctrines, the case is quite different. The most striking difference is then present in the Berkeleian use of the conception of will, the essential faculty of mind. As we have seen, mind in the system of Berkeley replaces motion in the system of Hobbes. How different the content of these two terms! There is the great Mind of the universe, whence the order and continuity of nature; there is the individual mind, whence our ability to call up our ideas in the imagination and to think connectedly. Thus the order of the universe and mental control flow from Berkeley's unanalysed conception of mind. In Hobbes' system of motion, if we take it with its implicit consequences, the human mind is but an insignificant corner into which can come mere eddies of this universal motion. What motions come into this mind depend upon its location in the universe, and it must continue to repeat these motions until new motions break in from without to counteract them. It possesses no original activity, but is the product of experience. How different all this is from Berkeley's soul that can make and unmake ideas of its own volition, thereby displaying a freedom and spontaneity almost inconceivable. For such a soul while dependent upon universal mind is none the less separate, independent and distinct, this individuality being of its very essence.

The question at issue here is a most fundamental one,—is the term *will* a fruitful concept? Hobbes, taking the present-day position, dismisses the term *will* as unfruitful, while Berkeley regards it as unanalysable and hence fundamental. For *will* is just this originaive, active essence of mind back of which we cannot go. On this fundamental and unanalysable character of the term *will* is staked Berkeley's whole case. Mind cannot be explained in terms of other things; we have not the concept capable of meeting the situation. But, according to Berkeley, all other things can be explained in terms of mind. Whence his psychological interpretation of the universe.

But both philosophers are inconsistent. Hobbes, as we have seen, made use of what Berkeley chooses to cover in the term *will* when he introduced arbitrary signs and the law of interest, thereby cutting his mind off from the universe of which it was a part. While Berkeley was also inconsistent, when after setting forth so clearly the true nature of mind as the power of one experience to call up another, and emphasizing the part that custom and habit play in its building up,—when in direct opposition to all the genuine contributions that he had made to the science of psychology he chose to rest his case upon the unanalysed conception of *will*.

IV.

HUME: CRITICAL POSITIVISM.

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Locke had said that the mind gets its idea of power from an observation of the will; Berkeley, following in his wake, had taken the same popular, unanalyzed conception of power and through it had explained the behavior of not only mind but also of the universe. The investigations of Hume fail to uphold Berkeley's psychological interpretation of the universe; nothing, he argues, is to be gained by proceeding upon unanalyzed conceptions. We must, to have a true science, go back to the original impressions upon the mind. In terms of these impressions alone are we to know in the scientific sense. Our author is thoroughly convinced that if we employ this method, which is the same as that employed in the natural sciences, the results will be far from fruitless. In this connection he says:

"For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations * * * and any hypothesis that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical."⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Introd., page XXI.

Proper acquaintance with the extent and force of the human understanding means much to the race.

"'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences (mathematics, natural philosophy and natural religion, i. e., through the study of man) were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of the human understanding, and could we explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings." ⁽¹⁾

In this our author may have been under the influence of Hobbes who saw fit in his study of the state to prefix a study of man in which, as we have seen, he had not a little to say about mental phenomena and their relation to morality. But it must be said that the contributions of Hume to this subject are such that his independence should be recognized by all. Hume does not come at the subject with Hobbesian dogmatism; for the atmosphere of thought in his day was far different from what it was in the day of Hobbes. But be it to his credit that he had faith; for, if experiments that were made with care were judiciously collected and compared, he saw no reason why a science might not be built up that would

"not be inferior in certainty, and much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension." ⁽¹⁾

With such faith in the possibility of such a science, which certainly contrasts well with Comte,

⁽¹⁾ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Introduction, pp. XIX and XXIII.

Hume himself goes to work in serious earnest to investigate mental phenomena. It is the results of this investigation that we now have under consideration. The method employed by Hume is that of the individualistic introspective psychology. There was a tentative acceptance of the Cartesian two-world theory. While his steps in part retrace those of his predecessors, they possess sufficient uniqueness and originality to demand full treatment. The perspicuous manner with which he details the results of his own investigation; the success with which he sums up and brings to account the work of his predecessors, is reason enough for setting forth in some detail even at the expense of repetition, what he has to say.

"All perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call *impressions* and *ideas*";

the former are those perceptions that strike upon the mind with most force and violence in entering consciousness; under which are included also all sensations, passions and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas are understood faint images, or copies, of the impressions, that are found in our thinking and reasoning. There is no ground for confusion; for broadly speaking, the distinction is that commonly made between feeling and thinking.

"Tho' it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in

(¹) *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Bk. 1, Sec. I, page 1.

sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of the soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: as on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas."⁽¹⁾

In this use of the term idea, Hume feels that he is restoring the term to its proper signification; while the term impression has been introduced to supply a real need, there being no word in the language used with just the meaning here given it. Ideas, then, are for Hume not what they are for Berkeley or even Locke; their meaning for this term was entirely too broad. On the contrary they are mental images, or what Berkeley calls ideas of the imagination, and Hobbes, imaginations, or fancies; in all cases the term is opposed to phantasms of sense.

Perceptions are again divided into two classes: Simple and Complex; the same distinction is carried out consequently in ideas and impressions. Simple perceptions admit of no distinction or separation; while on the other hand complex ones may be distinguished into parts, as in the case of an apple, which may be distinguished into color, taste and smell.

On first examination, it appears that our ideas are exact copies of our impressions; for they appear to always correspond, the only difference being the force and vivacity of the one as opposed to the faintness of the other. But on further ex-

(¹) *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. 1, Sec. I, p. 2.

amination, it may be seen that this is not the case; for it will be found that one may imagine things that he has not seen and, on the other hand, see things that it is impossible for him to conceive images of in the mind. For example, what is more easy than for one to bring up in his imagination an image of the New Jerusalem, whose pavements are of gold, whose walls are of rubies; on the other hand, having seen Paris, it is impossible to call up an image of that city that in any wise does it justice. It appears, then, that in the case of complex ideas, strictly speaking, one could hardly say that they are copies of their impressions.

But this is not the case with our simple impressions; in regard to these our author has this to say:

"That the rule holds here without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea. That the idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that impression, which strikes our eyes in the sunshine, differ only in degree, not in nature."⁽¹⁾

By way of convincing those who doubt the truth of this conclusion, our author challenges anyone to point to a single simple impression that has not its corresponding simple idea.

This constant conjunction does not arise from chance; either our ideas are caused by our impressions or our impressions are caused by our ideas. It is discovered that our impressions make their

(¹) *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Bk. I, Sec. I, page 3.

appearance first; this fact added to an equally significant one, that the loss of some faculty, as that of sight, marks not only the loss of impressions but also of ideas that correspond to those impressions, leaves our author to conclude that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions. This is a matter beyond question. The fact that it may be possible, indeed doubtless is, for one by bare power of the imagination to supply a deficiency in the nature of one member of a series of shades of colors, for instance, is not held to invalidate the above law. It is also true that there are such things as secondary ideas, still fainter images of these faint copies of the impressions; this again is held to mark no exception to the above law, as to which there can hardly be a question.

Impressions are of two kinds: those of sensation and those of reflection. The former arise in the soul from unknown causes (for our author does not make the gratuitous assumptions of Des Cartes, Hobbes, Berkeley and the plain man), while the latter are derived for the most part from our ideas. As impressions are prior to our ideas, so impressions from unknown causes are prior to those of reflection. The study of these impressions that arise from unknown causes are not within the task of the moral philosopher, such as Hume regarded himself. This is rather the province of the anatomist and natural scientist.

Hence our author turns his attention to the impressions of reflection and to ideas.

When an impression from some unknown cause is made in the mind, its copy is taken; this is what is called an idea, or as we might say to-day, an image. This idea, or mental image, arising in the mind, may itself create an impression through some passion; this impression, again, is copied by the mind and there exists a new idea, or image, in the mind. This last idea may itself, so far as we know, arise in the mind creating a new impression with its corresponding idea, and so on indefinitely. Such impressions as are thus gotten from ideas in the mind are what are called impressions of reflection. Thus, for example, if one experiences the sensation of cold, his mind from this impression which is created by an unknown cause forms an idea of cold. This idea of cold may again rise in the mind, creating new impressions of desire or pain. It is for this reason that our author feels that control of the passions is intimately allied with that of ideas. For this reason, again, he turns his attention to ideas, the proper knowledge of the behavior of which he thinks will greatly simplify the problems of our passions and emotions.

There are two faculties by which we repeat our ideas: memory and imagination. Ideas repeated by the former are more of the character of impressions than those of the imagination, *i. e.* the former

are more strong, painted in much more vivid colors, and what is a more important distinction, tied down to a strict reproduction of impressions without variation; while those of the imagination, on the other hand, are less distinct and more unsteady, but not bound down to the same order and form of original impressions. Both classes of ideas are dependent upon impressions; but while this is true the liberty of the imagination in transposing and changing its ideas is very great,—far more so, Hume would have us believe, than we are ordinarily aware. Whence fiery dragons, winged horses, etc. For the imagination plays to the extreme in separating complex ideas and in uniting simple ones, as is evident from such an idea as that of a winged horse. But to the activity of the imagination belong not merely such harmless mental creations as those of the kind just noticed, but, it may be, such principles as that of causality.

The many roles that the term, imagination, has played in philosophy is noticed by Hume himself, who in a note apologizes for his own lax use of it, which he says is anything but philosophic, thus:

“By this expression it appears that the word, imagination, is commonly us'd in two different senses; and tho' nothing be more contrary to true philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings I have often been oblig'd to fall into it. When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings”,⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. I, Sec. IX, note p. 117.

while otherwise we are left to understand that the context alone will be sufficient to explain its meaning. This note by itself might easily be misleading; for the imagination is a far more fundamental term in the writings of Hume than these words lead us to believe. We have hinted that it is this faculty that may lead us to believe in such a principle as that of causality and, as we shall see later, the order of the external world, or in the words of Hume,

"A much greater regularity among objects than what they have when we look no further than our senses."

If we look a little more deeply into his use of this term, we shall see that his use of it is just about what Hobbes' use of it was. The imagination is the most fundamental term in mental phenomena for both. Let us see. All images, or ideas, are caused by impressions; when we call them up as they were experienced in impressions, we call this memory; when we call them up free from these chains, we call this imagination. But the fundamental nature is the same, just as it was in the case of Hobbes, recall of images in consciousness. So, too, our author may speak of reason, the understanding and other faculties of the mind, but this must not lead us to believe that he is an advocate of the faculty psychology because he makes use of its jargon, as indeed we all do; for these are all mere names for the one fundamental thing, the imagination, viewed from different

aspects. And yet we are told that the imagination is not as significant as the understanding, which none the less quite contradictorily is simply

“the general and more established properties of the imagination.”⁽¹⁾

which quotation it appears is in itself sufficient witness to our author's Hobbistic use of the term imagination.

“Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou'd join them”;⁽²⁾

but this is not the case. Ideas of memory must of course reappear in the mind as they have been experienced as impressions, but particular reference is had now to ideas of imagination. Manifestly to place them under the same law as those of memory would be simply to transpose them to that class, and the distinction made between our ideas at the outset would be a useless one. Ideas of the imagination are free and at the beck and call of the imagination, but they are subject to the limitations set above, *i. e.* no ideas are joined by chance. This must mean that when our author makes them subject to the beck and call of the imagination he means that they are appearing according to some law of the mind that must be discovered. And

⁽¹⁾ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. 1, Part IV, Sec. VII, p. 267.

⁽²⁾ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk 1, Sec. IV, p. 10.

here we shall see that he goes back to Hobbes via Berkeley and Locke. He says:

(There is a) "uniting principle among our ideas (which) is not to be considered as an inseparable connexion; for that has been already excluded from the imagination; nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty; but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails."⁽¹⁾

This use of "gentle force" looks very much as if Hume were going to give us a causal law between ideas that he is later to deny us in the case of bodies. But we shall have to place the emphasis here upon the "gentle"; for this statement is soon completely swallowed up in his definite statement of the law of association. For back of this union of ideas stands nature; our experience in the way of education, habit, custom, as well as reality direct, is the basis of mental association. Nature tells what simple ideas are most proper to be united into complex ones, but the union of these ideas is the work of the imagination.

There are three great qualities by which the mind passes from one idea to another, to wit: Resemblance, Contiguity in time or space, and Cause and Effect, out of which qualities comes the law of association. The imagination runs easily from one idea to another that resembles it; this is a matter of too common observation to demand proof from our author. As the senses are constantly forced to pass from one object to another

⁽¹⁾ *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Bk. 1, Sec. 4, page 10.

that are contiguous in time or space; so the imagination by long habit comes to acquire the same method in thinking,—indeed, the best that can be said of these relations so far as our author can see, is that they are habits of mind. The most important of which is that of cause and effect; of which later.

A comparison with Hobbes at this point is not without interest. Hobbes accepts the law, though he does not state it so clearly, more completely than Hume; for Hume will not admit that this is the only way of mind. The imagination uses this method, as is evident, but who knows what else it may have at its disposal. He seems to be afraid that to go further would commit him to some presupposition such as Cartesian dualism, as in Locke; or materialism, as in Hobbes; or spiritualism, as in Berkeley. Which, of course, has its very commendable aspect.

The position here taken by Hume had important bearings; its relevancy in the matter of abstract ideas, for instance, is much better understood than it was in the case of Berkeley. Here we find Hume in complete agreement with Berkeley. He says that he considers the contribution of the Bishop in this respect the greatest and most valuable discovery that has been made “of late years in the republic of letters.” He would, therefore, endeavor merely to confirm it by some arguments that will, he hopes, put it beyond all doubt and controversy. He holds that it is utterly im-

possible to form the idea of quantity or quality without forming a definite and concrete idea of it; to do otherwise would be both to have and not have an idea at one and the same time, since to have an idea is to have an idea of some object. The image, then, that the mind brings up is a concrete particular image, but the mind not only brings up such an image at such a time when some word is mentioned, or the image in some way called up,—it does a great deal more; it calls up a certain custom and habit that has gone with images of this character. So that when the mind calls up one concrete image, it has all other kindred concrete images in the antechamber of consciousness ready to be summoned when needed. Thus, if some one having in his mind the image of an equilateral triangle, should say that the angles of a triangle are equal, immediately in the mind of the listening mathematician there would arise the images of those triangles of which this statement would not hold true. The ability to deny the truth of such a general statement would rest not as with Kant upon pure intuition by means of the forms of space, but simply upon the experience of the mathematician; for it is not likely that any but one who has had such experience would be able to controvert the general proposition.

Complex ideas formed by the association of ideas are divided into three classes: Relations, Modes and Substances. Relations are those qual-

ities that make an object admit of comparison; impressions such as these are prior to our ideas of relations. A quality by which two ideas are connected in the imagination, or that particular circumstance in which we think proper to compare two ideas in the fancy, may be said to be a relation. These may be comprised under seven general heads which are the sources of all philosophical relation. They are resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity, quality, contrariety, and cause and effect; difference being really a negation of any relation, is for that reason excluded from this list.

The idea of substance is one of peculiar interest. On investigation our author finds that it cannot be derived either from impressions of sense or from those of reflection. For on the one hand it would have to be a sound, or a taste, or an odor; while on the other hand it would have to be an emotion. Neither of which seems to be the case; so our author concludes:

"We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities."⁽¹⁾

What is said here of substance applies also to modes.

"The idea of substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, *that are united by the imagination*, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall either to ourselves or others, that collection."⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. 1, Sec. 6, page 16.

The difference between the ideas of substance and that of a mode is this: in the one case the qualities that form a substance are referred to an unknown something in which they are supposed to inhere; or to put the matter otherwise, we may say that these qualities are supposed to be inseparably connected in relations of contiguity and causation,—association, in short. While on the other hand, this is not true in the case of the idea of a mode. From which it follows that, if on observation it can be found that another quality can be brought under the same relation to the same substance that other qualities sustain to the substance in question, this quality must then be added to the substance, though it may not have been so regarded before. In the case of a mode, this again is not true; for the uniting principle here is not that of contiguity and causation, or if it so appears, it is not the foundation of the complex idea, as in the cases of the dance and beauty, both of which, according to the definition, are modes.

In his attack upon substance, we have seen Hume following in the wake of Locke and Berkeley; but in each case he has plainly extended their endeavors. Locke, though he strongly emphasized the mind and its activity, never got past the notion of substance as the carrier of primary qualities. Berkeley demolished the conception of corporeal substance; matter for him is a mere abstraction. From Hume's discussion of substance,

wherein he made it clear that certain qualities at the liberty of mind, or on its motion, may or may not be qualities adhering in the substance, it becomes quite clear that the union of qualities for him is not explained in terms of a substance that bears them but in terms of mental habit. It is the mind that unites and holds in union the simple ideas that constitute a substance.³ As Hume's contributions at this point are far from insignificant for the future history of philosophy it may not be amiss to go into them at greater detail.

Hume, as we have seen above, followed with great interest Berkeley's attack upon abstraction. Here, as well as in his Theory of Vision, he found Berkeley setting forth the part that custom plays in building up mind. It cannot be said that either Hobbes or Locke failed to appreciate to some extent the significance of habit for mind. Locke certainly recognized it in its ill effects upon the mind; Hobbes gave full place to it in setting forth his theory of mental phenomena under the head of trains of thought. But it is to Berkeley's credit that he was the first to *clearly set forth the principle*. Though it is quite questionable whether Berkeley fully understood the tremendous significance of his discovery. His preconceptions were such that it was hardly possible for him to do so. It was, then, left to Hume to bring into complete clearness this principle. In doing so, he opens the question whether it is not wise to extend the sub-

jective coherence that Locke referred to; whether the principle of causality which his predecessors had assumed may not also come under the head of subjective coherence, *i. e.*, be an association of ideas gained from experience.

Take for example *causation*. The idea of cause must be derived from some relation among objects. On examination we find that the relation of contiguity is essential to that of causation; but while this is true, it by no means constitutes causation, since there are many cases of this relation in which there is not present any causation. There is a necessary connection that must be taken into consideration; this necessary connection, it may be said, is the very essence of causation. The best that can be got at in this investigation into the nature of causation is that there exists in the mind an expectation that certain phenomena will follow certain other phenomena; and this expectation comes of our experience. Causation, therefore, reduces itself to a matter of habit and custom.

(A cause is) "an object precedent and contiguous to another and *so united with it in the imagination*, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other."⁽¹⁾

What it is that causes one thing to follow another; why one idea is led by a "gentle force" to call up another in our imagination,—these are both alike

(¹) *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Bk. 1, Part III, Sec. XIV, p. 172.

inexplicable. The law of causation cannot be established logically; there is no contradiction in saying that a thing originates without a cause. Nor does an appeal to intuition render such a relation valid. Thus are brushed aside the proofs of predecessors and contemporaries, and Hume is said to have established the genuine problem of causality,—his marvelous contribution to thought.

The significance of this conclusion is realized on reflection. If knowledge is of two kinds, as Leibnitz put it, knowledge of reason and of matter of fact; why, what we know of the latter is based upon the causal law and the other is really negligible in comparison. To a pragmatist, of course, it matters little whether the causal law be established or not; if it holds good, why then it does hold good and we may say that just in so far it is a true relation. In this respect as well as in others Hume was a good pragmatist. For it must be understood that he never doubted for one moment but that to proceed on such trust would yield fruitful results. This has a close relation to his emphasis upon the value of the study of mind. For, as our author puts it later in his Inquiry:

“When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.”⁽¹⁾

(1) *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Sec. 7, Part II, p. 76.

Humean skepticism, if one chooses to give it such a name, could never result in such stagnation of human inquiry as is by common report said to have resulted from the skeptical position of ancient philosophers; which leads to the suggestion that that stagnation may have been due rather to wars and rumors of wars.

There are, however, passages in Hume's writings that lead one to believe that he himself took very seriously his analysis of this abstraction of our experience; a thing that is quite remarkable and noteworthy. Why should Hume, of all men, after having made so clear that our habits of mind are due to our experience, worry so over this abstraction of the uniformity of all our experience? The answer lies in the fact that he emphasized the atomistic character of our experience, the separateness of single states of consciousness, out of proportion to the emphasis that he placed upon the continuity of experience. The *cause* cannot be separated from the effect; they are a continuous whole. But no one knew this better than Hume.

And yet we mark this same disposition to emphasize the discreteness of experience in his search after the soul; separate states of consciousness far outweigh for him that experience of identity that is ever back of them. It was in this way that he is said to have demolished the idea of spiritual substance.

"If any impression gives rise to the idea of *self* that impression must continue invariably the same, thro' the

whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea. * * * For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception. * * * And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body I should be entirely annihilated nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity."(¹)

May we not with justice say that Hume here again, to use a figure from mathematics, lays the stress upon the points to the exclusion of his experience of the whole line. But Hume may well answer in that case, and with warrant that is denied him in the case of the principle of causality, that these separate states are just what he does experience. This is quite true and the law of association is the best formal explanation of their union in the imagination. But is there not a real principle back of the formal one; otherwise how is it when I wake up in the morning that my experience of yesterday is hitched on to that of to-day? That is, unless Hume gives me a body in which to carry these experiences, which he cannot consistently do. It is but fair that it be borne in mind, however, that the self that Hume here attacks is the scholastic soul substance.

(¹) *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Part IV, Sec. VI, p. 251.

The question here raised by Hume however, is of fundamental importance. In what terms shall we look at the world? As the causal principal turns out to be a mere habit of mind, giving us at bottom a discontinuous world of reality; so the spiritual substance of Berkeley proves also to be a mere creation of the imagination, leaving us as mind a mere flux of separate images. The idea of power in the one case (causation) as the idea of power in the other case (will, mind) are but habits of mind. If Hume was the first to set forth this theory of causation, he was not the first to maintain that will is not really a power; for this we saw to be the true Hobbistic position. But Hume would deduce what Hobbes merely stated with dogmatic emphasis. The question is still an open one. There are those who claim that the term will still deserves a place in both psychology and metaphysics; that the fact that the will is not a subject of observation need not be prejudicial to its case, or interfere with the fruitfulness of the use of such a term. For no more can be said in favor of energy and motion; it is only their effects, not their essence, that we see and know.

After Hume has made his case, what has he left? Nothing but two streams of experience. Whence, then, all this world of our experience? What is it, according to Hume, that has given us these concepts of causality, substance, self,—the ordered external world? The *imagination*. It is this fac-

ulty that has given us the Lockean bearer of the qualities of things, that leads us to believe in those things that are not present to sensation, to infer the future existence of the chick from the egg, to conceive of an indivisible, immaterial soul, or mind,— to put the matter briefly, it is this faculty that leads us to believe in the existence of an ordered external world and all that it has for us, as Berkeley had already shown us; as well as to believe in the existence of the world within, which is Hume's own contribution. There is a suggestion from nature, whereby we gain our experience, and the imagination does the rest. This great uniformity of nature as well as this continuity of our inner experience are alike the results of the magical activity of this faculty.

For, says Hume, if we look our experiences squarely in the face, must we not openly confess that they are singularly discontinuous and incoherent when compared with what we read into them. It is this disposition of the mind to read things into nature that had been declared a weakness of mankind by Bacon, who so wisely cautioned us against its wiles. It was this same faculty that had been noticed by Locke; that had been made the most fundamental thing in the universe by Berkeley, and that was yet to play the most significant role ever played by any faculty in the transcendental philosophy of Kant,—it is before this faculty and its magical works that Hume stands appalled. Hume never pretends to get

around mental union. Nothing is clearer than this. He attacks time and again these creations of the mind, *not to deny* that they are *creations of the mind*, but to make clear that they are *just this* and no more. And yet, oddly enough, Hume's most earnest efforts seem to be devoted to an endeavor to undermine belief in that with which he was continually confronted, a *uniting mind*.

It was left Kant to about-face. And this is how it is that Kantianism came to be,—how his Copernican revolution came about. It had already been made possible, and Kant felt imperative, by Hume. It was an easy matter for Kant to restore to confidence, the ego, his *transcendental unity of apperception*, which happens to be a new name for Hume's faculty of the *imagination*,—and then to tell us in ambiguous German how it is that *macht zwar Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht*.

CONCLUSION.

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In the foregoing studies we have traced the gradual development of the conception of the uniting mind.

In Hobbes the mind was regarded as the product of experience, the essential function of which was that it preserved our experience. His position we saw was not so different from that of present-day teachers; the mind is an organ of behavior that lifts man out of the slavery of his immediate environment, enabling him to react to stimuli not merely for the present. No stress was laid upon the theoretical problems of epistemology.

Locke, as we have seen, while in many respects advancing the cause of psychology, defends the conception of the mind as an entity above and opposed to matter. While he laid no great stress upon the atomistic character of our experience, he emphasized very much the representative theory of knowledge, the doctrine that the mind knows not external objects, but *ideas* whose appearance depends entirely upon the mind's activity,—*unless the mind attends there is no perception*. Qualities are carried by substance, just as ideas are united in the thinking substance. The mind is not the product of experience, as taught by Hobbes, but the materials of thought are. The essential function of mind for Locke is the organ-

ization of these materials into the fabric of knowledge. This organizing activity of mind was not, as in the case of Hobbes, the subject of causal explanation. The processes of mental operations were *described* in his discussion of natural faculties, but the nature of the mind's activity is *sui generis*.

Berkeley again advances the causes of psychology, unconsciously bringing to great clearness the true nature of mind,—the tendency of one experience to call up another. But while this is so, through his attack upon abstract ideas he undermined the doctrine of substance; the union of qualities, therefore, which for Locke was explained in terms of substance, had now to be explained in terms of spiritual substance. Whatever union there is, whether in nature or in mind, is due to the same uniting principle. *Esse* is *percipi*.

Hume even more than Berkeley emphasized the *discreteness* of our experience. What we experience is singularly discontinuous when compared with what we read into it. The order and coherence of nature arises out of the activity of the imagination. But what this uniting principle is and how it behaves are just as inexplicable mysteries as the law of cause and effect. This is Hume's theoretical position, although practically he betrayed a strong leaning towards mechanism. Kantianism is a positive (*i. e.*

opposed to negative and sceptical) and systematic re-statement of Hume's position. Passage after passage might be cited to prove this statement, but it can be made clear by a single citation:

"However strange, therefore, it may appear at first, it must nevertheless have become clear by this time that the *affinity of phenomena* and with it *their association*, and through that, lastly, *their reproduction also according to laws*, that is, the *whole of our experience*, becomes possible only by means of that *transcendental function of imagination*, without which no concepts of objects could ever come together in one experience." (1)



(1) *Critique of Pure Reason*, Transcendental Analytic, Sec. III.

VITA.

The author of the foregoing studies, John Pickett Turner, is the son of the Reverend William Allen Turner and Mary Jane Pickett. He was born May 5, 1876, at Cedar Hill, Tennessee. After elementary training in public and private schools, he was sent to the Webb School, Bellbuckle, Tennessee, where he was prepared for college. During 1896-7 he engaged in secondary work. In September, 1897, he entered Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee; the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts were completed June, 1900. For the year following, 1900-'01, he was appointed Scholastic Fellow in Vanderbilt University. During the tenure of this fellowship he took courses in Classical Philology under Chancellor J. H. Kirkland and Professor H. C. Tolman; in Old English under Dr. B. M. Drake, and in Literature under Professor Richard Jones under whose direction his Master's thesis was written. In June, 1901, he received the degree of Master of Arts. During 1901-3 he taught in Secondary Schools of Atlanta, Georgia. June, 1903, he joined Mr. A. H. Hughey, of Vanderbilt University, in establishing the Hughey & Turner School at Weatherford, Texas. September, 1907, in accordance with his plan, he gave up Secondary Education to enter Columbia University. At this institution his work has been in the Departments of Philosophy and Psychology. He has taken courses under Professors John Dewey, F. J. E. Woodbridge, G. S. Fullerton, W. P. Montague, J. M. Cattell, R. S. Woodworth, D. S. Miller, A. O. Lovejoy, Dr. W. T. Bush and Dr. H. C. Brown. In February, 1908, he was appointed Tutor in Mathematics in the College of the City of New York. The present studies were written under the direction of Professor Frederick J. E. Woodbridge.

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